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Case No. 20090061
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Jason Tyler Hamblin,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from four convictions: one for rape of a child, a firstdegree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402.1 (West Supp. 2009); one
for sodomy on a child, a first-degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 765-403.1 (West Supp. 2009); and two for sexual abuse of a child, second-degree
felonies, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-404.1 (West Supp. 2009). This
Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (West 2009) (pour
over provision).1

1

Citations are to current statutes, unless the relative section has been
substantively amended.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue 1. Was Defendant's motion for new trial based on an alleged Brady
violation properly denied, where Defendant knew the essential impeachment facts
before trial, knew the full details during trial, and successfully used the information
to obtain three acquittals?
Standard of Review. The merits should not be considered, because Defendant
fails to marshal the facts supporting the trial court's ruling as required by rule

24(a)(9), UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. See United Park City Mining Co. v.
Stichting Mayflower Mountain Ponds, 2006 UT 35, f t

24-27, 140 P.3d 1200.

Alternatively, a trial court's denial of a motion for new trial is upheld on appeal
"absent a clear abuse of discretion." State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, f 31, 37 P.3d 1073
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Issue 2. Did the court's partial deferral of Defendant's rule 412 motion deny
him confrontation, where without further ruling or objection, Defendant was
allowed to fully question the victim and her brother Adam about Adam's prior
sexual assaults on her?
Standard of Review. The merits should not be considered, because the claim is
not preserved and Defendant fails to marshal the facts. See State v. Patrick, 2009 UT
App 226, | 12,

P.3d

; United Park City Mining Co., 2006 UT 35, Iff 24-27.

Alternatively, an evidentiary ruling will not be reversed on appeal "unless it is
2

manifest that the trial court so abused its discretion that there is a likelihood that
injustice resulted." State v. Tarrats, 2005 UT 50, | 16, 122 P.3d 581. Whether an
evidentiary ruling violated a defendant's right of confrontation is a question of law
that is reviewed for correctness. State v. Clark, 2009 UT App 252, % 10,

P3d

Issue 3. Did the trial court properly permit the Information to be amended to
reflect the correct period that Defendant lived in the victim's family home, where
the child-victim consistently stated that Defendant assaulted her when he lived in
the home, but was confused as to her exact age?
Standard of Review. The merits should not be considered, because the issue is
not preserved and Defendant fails to marshal the facts. See Patrick, 2009 UT App
226, 112; United Park City Mining Co., 2006 UT 35, | If 24-27. Alternatively, a trial
court's decision to permit amendment of an information is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. See State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134,137 (Utah App. 1989); UTAH R. CRIM. P.
4(d) (both recognizing trial court's discretion to amend information).
Issue 4. Has Defendant established that his counsel was ineffective for not
doing "something more" to preserve his appellate claims?
Standard of Review. The merits should not be considered, because Defendant
fails to adequately brief the issue as required by rule 24(a)(9). See State v. Green, 2004
UT 76, | t 11-15, 99 P.3d 820. Alternatively, "[a]n ineffective assistance of counsel

3

.

claim raised for the first time on appeal presents a question of law." State v. Perry,
2009 UT App 51, f 9, 204 P.3d 880.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, A N D RULES
The following rules are reproduced in Addendum A:
R. APPELLATE P. 24 - Briefs;
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 4 - Prosecution of Public Offenses;
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 24 - Motion for New Trial;
UTAH R. EVID. 412 - Admission of Alleged Victim's Sexual Behavior or
Alleged Sexual Predisposition.
UTAH

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 2006, Defendant was charged with one count each of rape of a child, object
rape of a child, and sodomy on a child (R. 1-4). The information alleged that
Defendant, an adult, sexually assaulted his nine- or ten-year-old stepsister M.B. in
the family home (R. 3). The assaults included vaginal rape, anal rape, and object
rape by inserting a 'Tight bulb or M & M container in M.B/s rectum" (id.).
The information was amended before the preliminary hearing began (R. 5663; R64: 4). The charge of object rape based on use of a light bulb was deleted and
all references to the light bulb omitted from the Information (R. 56-63).

The

amended information now alleged that Defendant raped M.B. by inserting an "M &
M candy container and a 'dildo' in her anus" (R. 63). See Addendum B (First
Amended Information). The charges were also expanded to include three counts of
rape of a child, two counts of object rape of a child (based on the "M & M" container

4

and dildo), five counts of sodomy on a child, and four counts of aggravated sexual
abuse of a child (R. 56-63; R64: 68-70). The probable cause statement explained that
M.B. believed the assaults began when she was "approximately 9 years old, when
she lived on Elm Street" and ended " when [Defendant] went to prison on unrelated
charges, around the time [she] turned 10 years old in 2000" (R. 63). Defendant did
not object to the amendments (R64: 4). After the information was amended, M.B.
testified at the preliminary hearing and stated that Defendant used only two objects
to penetrate her, an "M & M" container and a dildo (R64:16-17 & 32-33). Defendant
was bound over for trial on the amended charges (R64: 68-71).
Extensive pretrial discovery was requested and provided (R. 11-13,22-23,27,
34, 39-40, 53, 70-79, 85-91, 215-216). It included reports and audiotape of an Idaho
forensic interview, in which M.B. discussed Defendant's sexual assaults and
disclosed that another brother, Adam, had separately sexually assaulted her (R217:4
& 13; R415:137-41; R416: 25-26, 35-36, 55-56, 58-60).
Defendant moved in limine to admit evidence of M.B/s disclosure that Adam
also sexually assaulted her, pursuant to rule 412(b)(3), UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, an
exception to the rape shield rule (R. 92-103). Defendant acknowledged that rule
412(a) precluded the defense "from going in to all the details of [Adam's] sexual
abuse/7 but argued that he should be allowed to explore M.B/s disclosures to show
bias and motive because her "disclosures of the allegations against [Adam] were
5

made in a manner that raise questions about the propriety of her accusations against
the defendant and her motive for doing so" (R217: 42; R. 92-93). The prosecution
opposed the motion (R. 113-117 & 202-211).
The court granted the motion in part. It ruled that Defendant could generally
question M.B. or other witnesses about her disclosures to show: (1) any bias M.B.
harbored against Defendant or for Adam; (2) any material prior inconsistent
statements M.B. made concerning the charged crimes; and (3) any matter the
prosecutor opened the door to during direct examination (R217: 27-46; R. 265-267).
See Addendum C (Oral & Written Rulings). The court stated that more specific rulings
must wait until trial so that the relevancy of a question could be judged in context
(R217: 27-30 & 41-46; R. 267). Defendant agreed, stating more than once that he felt
" comfortable waiting to trial" for more specific rulings (R217: 28-30 & 42). Just
before trial, the court's extensive oral ruling was reduced to a short written order
(R217: 27-46; R. 265-267).
Before trial, Defendant sought permission to introduce redacted police reports
that showed that Defendant lived in New York State in 1999 and much of 2000, the
time period that M.B. thought Defendant lived in the Elm Street family home (R.
225-258). It was uncontested, however, that after Defendant left New York, he
returned to Utah and moved into the Elm Street residence, where he lived until his
arrest on an unrelated charge (R. 262; R64: 62-63; R416: 77 & 81-82). Consequently,
6

the prosecutor did not object to admission of the police records, but moved to
amend the Information to correctly include the period that Defendant lived in the
family home, i.e., through September 2001 (R. 259-264 & 339-340).

Defendant

lodged no objection and the end date in the Information was amended (R. 339-340 &
344-347). See Addendum D (Second Amended Information).
On February 27, 2009, a three-day jury trial commenced (R. 348-353). M.B.,
Adam, Defendant, and others testified. Eight counts were submitted to the jury (R.
352-353; R416: 4-7).2 The jury convicted Defendant of one count of rape of a child,
one count of oral sodomy on a child, and two counts of sexual abuse of a child (R.
352-353 & 409-410). The jury acquitted Defendant of two counts of object rape of a
child, one count of anal sodomy on a child, and one count of oral sodomy on a child
(id.). On June 30, 2008, Defendant was sentenced to terms of fifteen-years-to-life
imprisonment on each of the rape and sodomy convictions and one-to-fifteen-years
imprisonment on the two sexual abuse convictions (R. 417-418). The four sentences
were ordered to run concurrently to each other, but consecutive to a sentence
Defendant was already serving (id.).
On July 1, 2008, Defendant filed a motion for new trial, based on Brady v.
Mcuyland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), allegedly that the prosecutor failed to disclose until
2

The handwritten notations in the Second Amended Information reflect the
prosecutor's subsequent dismissal of three counts at trial (R. 344-347 & 352-353).
7

mid-trial that M.B. recanted her accusation that Defendant used a light bulb and
failed to disclose that Adam, in fact, did this (R. 419-446 & 462-463). The prosecutor
opposed the motion (R. 451-461). The court found that Defendant knew the
essential facts as early as the preliminary hearing, knew the details at trial, and
successfully used the impeachment evidence at trial (R. 477-485). Finding no Brady
violation, the court denied the new trial motion (id.).

See Addendum

E

(Memorandum Decision). Defendant timely appealed (R. 489-490).
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3
Defendant recognized that his younger stepsister M.B. was a perfect victim
(R416: 144).

After M.B/s birth mother lost her parental rights, Defendant's

stepmother, Christina, adopted the little girl and her brothers, Matt and Isaac (R414:
159-162). But Christina, who was bipolar and a chronic alcoholic, hated M.B. (R414:
117-118,162; R415:11, 48; R416: 48; 85 & 89). She singled out the little girl and, in
Defendant's words, "persecuted" her (R416:85). She was extremely abusive to M.B.
and frequently pulled her hair, slapped her, hit her with a brush, duct-taped her
mouth closed, called her stupid, and treated her rudely and unfairly (R414:117-118
& 162-164). She also did not believe M.B. and called her a liar (R415:113; R416: 93).

3

The facts are stated in the light most favorable to the jury's verdicts;
conflicting evidence is included "only as necessary to understand issues raised on
appeal." State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, | 2, 55 P.3d 1131 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
8

When M.B. was four or five years old, in 1994 or 1995, she told Christina
about "something that [Defendant] had done in the past" (R415: 110-112 & 113).
Christina said she was "lying" (R415:113).4
When M.B. was six or seven, around 1996 or 1997, she told Christina that
another brother Adam, Christina's biological son, was molesting her (R414: 50-51).5
Adam, who was then about fourteen or fifteen years old, admitted to sexually
touching M.B. and promised to stop, but sexually assaulted M.B. a "couple of more
times" (R414:50-51; R416:48-49). Adam finally stopped abusing M.B. in 1999, when
he was seventeen years old, because she told him to and because he felt guilty about
what he had done (R415: 51; R416: 44 &48-49). Despite the sexual assaults, M.B.
loved Adam:
Adam and I, our relationship was not—he was my brother. He —we
played video games. We wrestled. We did things. It wasn't all about
that; like it wasn't all about what was going on with sexual abuse. I
didn't hate him for it, because he wTas my brother, you know; like he
was there more. He treated me with some kind of respect.

4

M.B. alleged that Defendant molested her when she was four years old (R64:
19-21). The incident was not a charged offense and the trial court ruled that
evidence of Defendant's prior bad act was too remote in time to be admissible (R.
266). The fact that Christina did not believe her was admitted only to explain why
M.B. did not tell her mother about Defendant's subsequent assaults.
5

Calculations of what year an event took place are primarily based on the
witnesses' estimates of their ages. M.B. was born in June 1990 (R414: 159).
Defendant was born in August 1980 and was ten years older than M.B. (R. 3). Adam
was born in August 1982 and was eight years older than M.B. (R416: 44).
9

I guess what you would think it was, I didn't have anyone to go to. I
had no one. I was always in my basement [bedroom], so I kind of
figured that that was some kind of love, in a way. You know what I
mean? Like, I know it's really weird to say, I know, but yeah, it was
different. I mean Adam and me had a different relationship.
(R415: 52-53).
Adam's sexual assaults stopped before Defendant's sexual assaults began
(R415: 21, 84-87,103; R416: 44, 49 & 85).6
Christina and Defendant's father divorced around 1994 and Defendant
moved to New York to live with his mother (R414: 118; R415: 7 & 9-10; R416: 46;
R416: 74-75). In late 2000 or early 2001, when he was twenty or twenty-one years
old, Defendant returned to Utah and moved in with Christina and her children, into
a house she was renting on Elm Street (R414: 119-120, 165-166; R416: 82-83).
Defendant's bedroom was in the basement, next to M.B.'s room (R414:125; R416:
83). During the day, Defendant barely spoke to M.B., who was then ten or eleven
years old (R414:124-125; R415:15 & 91). At night, he sexually assaulted her (R414:
167-185; R415: 90 & 100-101).
The first time, Defendant came into her room, woke M.B. up, massaged her
back, and then turned her over and massaged her chest, over her night clothes
6

Defendant erroneously asserts that Adam abused M.B. before and after
Defendant's charged crimes. See Br.Aplt. at 11 & 34 (citing preliminary hearing). At
trial, M.B. clarified that this was not true and that Adam stopped abusing her when
she was nine years old (R415:84-87). Adam also confirmed that he stopped abusing
M.B. in 1999 (R416: 44 & 49).
10

(R414: 167-168). In later incidents, he massaged her chest, under her clothing, or
massaged her when she was naked (R414:168 & 170). Eventually, he massaged her
vagina (R414:169). When he touched her, she often saw or felt his erection (id.).1
One night, he told M.B., "I wonder what it would feel like if you kissed me
down there" referring to his penis, which was erect and exposed (R414:169). He
then grabbed the back of her head and told her to "suck on it" (R414:184). She did,
giving him "oral sex I guess you would call it" (R414:169). M.B. also thought he
"lick[ed]" her vagina" more than once, but was unsure because the incidents "mush
together sometimes" (R414:185).8
M.B. alleged that Defendant inserted an "M & M" candy container into her
anus and that another time he inserted a dildo (R414:171-177). She also alleged that
Defendant committed anal intercourse by inserting his penis in her anus (id.).9
Defendant vaginally raped M.B. multiple times (R414:177 & 179).10 The first
time, Defendant spit on his hand and wiped the spit on his penis, but otherwise did

7

Defendant was charged and convicted of two counts of sexual abuse of a
child (R. 344-347, 353 & 409-410; R416:130-132).
8

Defendant was convicted of one count of oral sodomy (her mouth on his
genitals) and acquitted of one count of oral sodomy (his mouth on her genitals) (R.
344-347,353 & 409-410; R416:132-133).
9

As will be discussed in Point I, the jury acquitted Defendant of all counts
involving anal contact, that is, one count of anal sodomy and two counts of object
rape (R. 344-347, 353 & 409-410; R416:133-135).
11

not moisten M.B. (R414:178). When he inserted his penis, it hurt M.B. so badly that
tears were running down her face and she could not breathe (id.). She started
bleeding, but Defendant did not stop (id.). Afterwards, he left the room without
saying anything (id.). M.B. wiped the blood off herself, washed her bloody sheets in
the basement laundry room, and turned her mattress over so no one would see the
blood stain (R414: 178-179). The second time was pretty much the same, except
Defendant rubbed her body more, but he still just "kind of rammed ,/ his penis into
her (R414:180-181).
When Defendant assaulted M.B., he "never said anything," but "shh" if she
cried out in pain (R414:176 & 180; R415: 55). "Like, he would come in, and do his
thing, and then go" (R414:180). Though Defendant and Adam committed some of
the same sex acts on M.B., she felt there were significant differences between the
assaults:
Kind of awkward to say that Adam showed compassion. He did. H e
showed remorse, like he would stop if I said ''ow/' He wasn't forceful.
He wasn't—we would talk; like not—you know, it was more verbal,
you know, when that was going on. It was very different. It was more
gentle and different.
(R415: 54).
[Defendant] never said anything to me. "Shh" was about the only
thing he ever said to me. He didn't care. He got—he finished his
10

Defendant was charged and convicted of one count of rape of a child (R.
344-347, 353 & 409-410; R416:135-136).
12

business and got up and left like I was a rag doll; like you know, like I
was a used something or other; like, you know, just came and got his
pleasure or whatever and left. And it didn't matter if he hurt me. He
was just ruthless.
(R415: 55).
Defendant assaulted M.B. so frequently — every week or two weeks —that
M.B. "became kind of numb" (R414: 177 & 180). To survive, she would "do
something to take [herself] away from that, you know, to kind of not be there in a
way," such as thinking "about being somewhere else; just being happy, you know;
just kind of detach myself I guess you would call it" (R414:180).
She hated Defendant and wanted the assaults to stop, but felt she was alone:
I hated him. I just— it's like — I felt very alone, that I couldn't even go
to my own mother; because she wouldn't believe me, or that —you
know, I don't know. I just felt really alone, and I hated him. And, you
know, he asked me for favors, like "run out to my truck and get this."
And I'd run out to there and to that, and —or just stuff around the
house, like get him water from the water cooler and stuff like that.
And I remember that. And I always did it, for some reason. I was just
scared of him, I guess is what you would say.
(R414:185). Though M.B. did not tell Christina about the assaults, she told her aunt
that Defendant was touching her and that she was physically afraid of him (R415:
116-117). The aunt told Christina. Christina said M.B. was lying and just wanted
attention (R415:117). The aunt "didn't know what [she] should do," so she "just
dropped it at that point" (id.).

13

M.B/s brother, Matt, who was a teenager at the time, once saw Defendant
leave her bedroom late at night (R415: 7 & 15). Matt thought this was strange,
because the two had littler interaction during the day, but Matt told no one (R415:15
& 36-37). Years later, when M.B. told him Defendant assaulted her, Matt felt guilty
for not protecting his younger sister and attempted suicide (R415:16-17).
Adam also once saw Defendant leave M.B/s room late at night (R416: 50).
Adam asked M.B. what Defendant was doing in her room (id.). She said he "was
doing stuff and 'bothering 7 her," which was the code word Adam "used w h e n [he]
talked about [his] abuse of her" and "left no question in [his] mind as to w h a t she
was talking about" (id). But Adam "didn't say anything at the time, to protect
[himself]" (id).
Defendant's assaults on M.B. stopped only when he moved out of the Elm
Street home in 2001 (R414:123-124 & 186-187; R416: 84). M.B. initially believed she
was nine when the assaults started and ten years old when Defendant left (R414:
186; R415: 64-65). But based on when her nephew was born and the evidence of
when Defendant moved back to Utah, M.B. realized that she must have been a bit
older, ten or eleven years old, when the assaults occurred (R414: 165-166 & 186;
R415: 65-66 & 70-71). She explained that though she was unsure of her exact age,
she knew that Defendant assaulted her when they lived on Elm Street, after he
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returned from New York (R414: 165-166). She wTas equally sure that the assaults
stopped only when he moved out of the house (R414:186-187).
A few months after Defendant moved out, Christina, M.B., and her younger
siblings moved to Montana (R414: 126 & 187). M.B. was about twelve or thirteen
years old and, by her own admission, 'Very promiscuous/' into drugs, and out-ofcontrol (R414:187-188). When M.B. was fifteen years old, her mother Christina died
(id.). At some point, the juvenile authorities placed M.B. in a Montana teenage
group home (R414:189; R415: 52). There, she told a therapist that Defendant had
repeatedly sexually assaulted her (R414:189; R415: 52,55, & 57). M.B. thought the
police were informed, but they never contacted her (R415: 57-59).
M.B. was transferred to a teenage group home in Idaho (R415: 53-54). She
received psychological treatment and filled out treatment packets that required her
to detail Defendant's assaults (id.). One packet discussed the destructive effect of
keeping sexual abuse a secret, which made M.B. realize that she needed to also
disclose Adam's assaults (R415: 53-54 & 57-58). She did not want Adam to go to jail,
but, nevertheless, told her therapist that Adam sexually assaulted her (id.).
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A child forensic specialist interviewed fifteen-year-old M.B. in April 2006
(R415: 122-123 & 133). n

The interview began with a discussion of the new

disclosures concerning Adam (R415:127-128,135-136, & 160-162). Midway through
the interview, M.B. began discussing Defendant's assaults (R415: 160-162). She
described in detail and drew a picture of how Defendant inserted a Christmas tree
light bulb in her anus and said, "Oh shit/ 7 when he thought he lost it (R415: 75-81,
154-156). Only later, after she completed the forensic interview and filled out
additional treatment packets detailing Adam's assaults, did M.B. realize that it was
Adam who had inserted the light bulb into her, not Defendant (R415: 79-81). She at
some point informed the prosecutor of her mistake. The light bulb charge was
dropped and all references to a light bulb deleted from the Information (R. 56-63;
R415:107-108). At the preliminary hearing, M.B. testified that Defendant used only
two objects: a "little, mini M & M tube" and a dildo (R64:16-17, 32-33, & 68-70).
The police interviewed Adam. He admitted that he had sexually assaulted
M.B. when she was younger and disclosed much, but not all, of his criminal
conduct. He revealed nothing about Defendant's assaults (R416:33-39,50-51, & 5811

The interviewer testified at trial and was questioned about a report she
made summarizing the interview (R415:132-174 & 188-204). Although the report
was preliminarily marked as an exhibit to facilitate her examination, the report was
not admitted into evidence (R425: 137-41 & 182-186; R416: 8-18, 70-73, & 95-109).
Defendant erroneously cites to and quotes from the report, as if it had been
admitted. See Br.Aplt. at 8.
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59).

Adam was charged, pled guilty, and was sentenced (R416: 54).

Adam

subsequently testified in this case to seeing Defendant leave M.B/s room, to M.B.'s
statement that Defendant was "bothering" her, and to his own sexual assaults on
her (R416: 48-68).
At trial, Defendant denied sexually assaulting M.B. (R416: 85-86). He testified
that he had little if anything to do with the younger child (R416: 92). He provided
no explanation for her allegations (R416: 79-93). His attorney, however, argued, in
opening and closing, that all the sex acts M.B. described really occurred, only Adam
committed them, not Defendant (R414: 106-112; R416: 145-146). The attorney
speculated that M.B. falsely accused Defendant because she did not care for him and
wanted to protect Adam from going to jail (R414: 111; R416:150-151).
The jury disagreed. They found M.B. credible and convicted Defendant of
rape, sodomy, and two sexual abuses (R. 409-410). Presumptively, because M.B.
confused the light bulb incident, the jury acquitted him of three charges involving
anal penetration or contact (id.). And based on her equivocation about Defendant
licking her vagina, the jury also acquitted him of one count of oral sodomy (id.).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant's appeal should be summarily rejected because, below, he failed to
preserve most of the issues now raised and, on appeal, he fails to comply with
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appellate marshaling and briefing requirements. Even if the merits were considered,
Defendant establishes no error or prejudice.
Allegation of Brady Violation.

The trial court properly denied Defendant's

motion for new trial after it found that the prosecutor had not suppressed material
impeachment evidence.
As early as the preliminary hearing, the defense knew that M.B. no longer
alleged that Defendant anally penetrated her with a light bulb and knew that the
charge was dropped. In the same hearing, the defense learned that Adam anally
raped M.B. in a way similar to Defendant. In light of this evidence and the defense
theory — that M.B. was really assaulted, but by Adam, not Defendant—the trial court
correctly found that Defendant knew or reasonably should have known before trial
that Adam likely anally raped M.B. with a light bulb.
At trial, M.B. and Adam testified that he used a light bulb to anally penetrate
her. The trial court rejected Defendant's assertion that he was "blindsided" by this
information and correctly found that, even if arguendo Defendant did not know the
details until trial, he knew the essential impeachment facts before trial and used
these facts to shape his trial strategy.

That strategy successfully resulted in

acquittals on three counts involving anal contact. Based on these facts, the trial
court correctly found that no Brady violation occurred.
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Rule 412: Evidence of Adam's Abuse of M.B. Rule 412 was never invoked to
bar Defendant's cross-examination of M.B. or any other witness. Nevertheless,
Defendant claims that the trial court's failure to fully rule on his rule 412 motion
before trial denied him confrontation. According to Defendant, the failure to fully
rule prevented him, in his open statement, from specifically referring to M.B.'s
recantation concerning the light bulb incident and from
assaults. The claim has no merit.
confrontation.

referring to Adam's

An opening statement does not implicate

Witness examination does. Her, no limits were placed on that

examination.
The trial court ruled that Defendant could explore M.B.'s bias, motive, and
material inconsistencies and opined that if the questions were "artful," preclusion
under rule 412 could be avoided. The court properly deferred any more specific
ruling until trial, so that the questions and objections could be judged in context. At
trial, no further ruling was sought and no rule 412 objections were made. Instead,
Defendant freely questioned M.B. and other witnesses about her bias, motive, and
material inconsistencies, and also about the details of Adam's sexual assaults on her.
In sum, no confrontation issue exists.
Amendment

of Information.

The trial court properly permitted the

Information to be amended to correctly reflect the period Defendant lived in the
family home. M.B. consistently accused Defendant of sexually assaulting her after
19

he moved into the Elm Street family home, but she was mistaken as to her precise
age when this occurred.

Other evidence established the correct time period.

Defendant did not oppose the amendment below and claims no prejudice from it on
appeal.
Alleged Ineffectiveness

of Counsel.

Defendant fails to establish that his

counsel was ineffective for not doing "something more" to preserve his appellate
arguments. The only deficiency that Defendant alleges is that his trial counsel
should have moved for a mid-trial continuance to better preserve his Brady issue.
The trial court did not procedurally bar the Brady claim, however, but fully
considered its merits. Consequently, Defendant cannot establish prejudice.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BECAUSE NO BRADY VIOLATION
OCCURRED, WHERE DEFENDANT KNEW THE ESSENTIAL
IMPEACHMENT FACTS BEFORE TRIAL, KNEW THEIR DETAILS
DURING TRIAL, AND USED THE INFORMATION TO HIS
ADVANTAGE
Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his
motion for new trial, based on an alleged Brady violation. See Br.Aplt. at 21-34.
According to Defendant, the prosecutor "made a calculated decision" to " willful [ly]
and deliberately]" conceal M.B.'s recantation that Defendant inserted a light bulb
in her anus and conceal that Adam, in fact, did this. Br.Aplt. at 21 & 23. Defendant
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alleges that concealment of this impeachment evidence until mid-trial prevented
him from making a better opening statement, prevented him from effectively
confronting MB., and prevented him from "asserting his best defense until the trial
was half over/ 7 Br.Aplt at 22 & 29. The argument lacks merit.
*

*

*

Due process requires that a prosecutor disclose evidence favorable to the
defense.

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963) (due process requires

disclosure of evidence that "would tend to exculpate [a defendant] or reduce the
penalty"); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (due process requires
disclosure of material impeachment evidence). "[Prosecutorial nondisclosure of
information favorable to the accused does not by itself constitute prejudicial error
requiring reversal of a conviction. . . . Rather, nondisclosure violates due process
under Brady only if the evidence at issue is material and exculpatory, and if the
defense did not become aware of the evidence until after trial." State v. Bisner, 2001
UT 99, \ 36,37 P.3d 1073. Evidence is material "if 'there is a reasonable probability
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different/"

Tillman v. State, 2005 UT 56, \ 29, 128 P.3d 1123

(quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995)).
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Accordingly, courts universally refuse to overturn convictions where
the evidence at issue is known to the defense prior to or during trial,
where the defendant reasonably should have known of the evidence,
or where the defense had the opportunity to use the evidence to its
advantage during trial[.]
Bisner, 2001 UT 99, | 33.
The merits of Defendant's Brady claim should not be considered, however,
because Defendant fails to comply with this Court's marshaling requirement.

In

any case, the trial court correctly found that no Brady violation occurred, because
Defendant knew of the impeachment evidence before and during trial and used it to
his advantage. See Add. E.
A. The merits should not be considered, because Defendant fails to
marshal the facts supporting the denial of the new trial motion.
Rule 24(a)(9), UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, requires Defendant to
"marshal all record evidence that supports" a challenged finding or fact-dependent
ruling. See Add. A. Proper marshaling requires Defendant to amass "every scrap of
evidence and draw all reasonable inferences that support the adverse decision and
then show why that evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the
decision, is legally insufficient.

United Park City Mines v. Stichting Mayflower

Mountain Ponds, 2006 UT 35, \ 24,140 P.3d 1200; State v. Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT
App 191, f 20, 186 P.3d 1023. To accomplish this, Defendant must embrace the
State's position:
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[Appellants] are required to "temporarily remove their own prejudices
and fully embrace the adversary's position"; they must play the
"devil's advocate/ 7 In so doing, appellants m u s t . . . not attempt to
construe the evidence in a light favorable to their case . . . [and must
not] merely re-argue the factual case presented in the trial court.
United Park City Mines, 2006 UT 35, \ 26 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). When an appellant fails to properly "perform this critical task, [the
appellant court] can rely on that failure to affirm the lower court's findings of facts"
and legal ruling. Id. at \ 27.
Here, Defendant fails to comply with rule 24's marshaling requirement.
Indeed, he never acknowledges it.

Consequently, his Brady claim may be

summarily rejected. See State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, \ 40,114 P.3d 551.
For example, Defendant asserts that the trial court's finding that Brady was
not violated is wrong because "the court failed to recognize that the light bulb
testimony was not a mere retraction of a prior allegation, but an admission that it
had happened at the hands of Adam." Br.Aplt. at 27. Defendant also claims that the
trial court erroneously rejected that he was "blindsided by the testimony that came
in the middle of the defense's cross-examination of [M.B.]." Id. The facts, w h e n
properly marshaled, do not support these assertions.
The marshaled facts establish and the trial court correctly found that the
prosecutor did not suppress material impeachment evidence and that Defendant
was aware of the impeachment facts as early as the preliminary hearing (R. 477-482).
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See Add. E. The original information charged one count of object raped based on the
light bulb incident. See Statement of Case at 4-5. Before the preliminary hearing
began, this charge was dropped and replaced with two charges of object rape based
on Defendant's alleged use of an "M & M" container and a dildo. See id. & Add. B.
The probable cause statement was also amended to delete reference to use of a light
bulb and to allege use of the "M & M" container and dildo (id.). When M.B. testified
at the preliminary hearing, she stated that the only objects Defendant used on her
were an "M & M" container and a dildo (R64:16-17 & 32-33). In the same hearing,
M.B. testified that Adam anally raped her in a manner "similar" to Defendant (R64:
50).
These facts establish that Defendant knew of M.B/s recantation long before
trial and that he reasonably should have known that, if Defendant did not use a
light bulb, Adam likely did. This is especially true where Defendant never claimed
that M.B. fabricated a sex act. To the contrary, the defense conceded that M.B. was
sexually assaulted as she described (R414: 106-112). See also Br.Aplt. at 21. The
defense claimed only that she falsely accused Defendant of these crimes to protect
Adam, who committed them (id.).
Other record facts, ignored by Defendant, support the trial court's finding that
Defendant knew the essential facts for impeachment before trial. In the pretrial
hearing on the rule 412 motion, defense counsel informed the court that M.B. had
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accused Defendant of anally penetrating her with a light bulb and had drawn a
picture showing how the light bulb had been inserted (R217:12-13). Defendant told
the court that in the preliminary hearing, M.B. denied that Defendant did this (R217:
12-13). Defense counsel also stated, "Adam has acknowledged all this [referring
generally to the sex assaults]. Adam is not disputing this. So, you also have a
situation where Adam is saying, 'yeah, that's what I did; I did all this'" (R217:17).
The court asked defense counsel if the defense theory was that Adam, not
Defendant, committed all the sex assaults (R217: 31). Defense counsel responded,
"I'm trying to be coy with the prosecutor and the court so I can be somewhat
prepared at trial, but it's not—it's obvious, because of the way in which everything
was disclosed, obviously; specifically certain allegations" (id.).
Defendant's failure to acknowledge these facts and their reasonable inferences
justify summary rejection of his claim. Additional marshaling failures will be
discussed with the merits.
B.

Alternatively, the trial court correctly found no Brady violation
and properly denied the motion for new trial.
If the merits are considered, the trial court properly denied the motion for

new trial because Defendant failed to establish a Brady violation.
As previously discussed, when the facts are properly marshaled, they
establish that at the preliminary hearing, Defendant knew that the light bulb rape
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charge was dropped and that M.B. no longer claimed Defendant did this. He also
knew that Adam anally raped M.B. in a manner // similar // to Defendant. See
discussion, supra. And he knew that despite the similarity of some of the sex acts,
M.B. viewed Adam and Defendant differently:
Adam and [Defendant] are very different. They did the same things, a
lot of the same things. But the way they did it, they were very
different. Adam showed emotion. If I said "ouch," started crying, he
stopped. [Defendant] had no emotion. He just did what he did and
left. . . . I feel Adam was man enough to admit what he did, so I have
more forgiveness for him.
(R64: 45-46). In his opening statement at trial, defense counsel told the jury that the
sex offenses M.B. described really happened, but were committed by Adam, not
Defendant (R414:106-112). Counsel stated that M.B. vindictively accused Defendant
because she "didn't give a darn about" him (R414: 111). He told the jury that M.B.
previously accused Defendant of a specific sex act that she had described in great
detail, but that she later said, "No, he never did anything like that" (R414:108-111).
These facts belie Defendant's assertion that he was prevented from arguing
his "best defense" in opening, that is, that "[M.B.] had been systematically abused
by Adam, but had made up the 'mean and uncaring 7 abuser allegations against
[Defendant] to protect Adam." See Br.Aplt at 21. Instead, the facts fully support the
trial court's finding that the defense knew the essential impeachment facts as early
as the preliminary hearing and "carefully planned his case for trial by focusing on
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the 'discrepancy between the complaining witness' initial disclosures and her
testimony at the preliminary hearing" (R. 481) (Add. E.).
Defendant claims that the court's finding is erroneous because the
"concealed" information was not only M.B/s recantation, but also that Adam
committed the crime.

Br.Aplt. at 27. More facts, again unacknowledged by

Defendant, demonstrate that he knew or should have known before trial that Adam
committed the crime.
In pretrial discovery, Defendant sought and obtained police reports of
Adam's investigation and prosecution (R. 39-40). He also obtained other reports of
Defendant's assaults that included within them information on Adam's assaults
(R64: 51-55).12
In a 2006 police interview, Adam admitted much of his abuse of M.B.,
including that he had anally raped her by inserting objects into her (R416:33-36). At

~ Defendant insinuates that the prosecutor tried to block his access to Adam's
investigative reports. See Br.Aplt. at 9-10. The record proves otherwise. Defendant
requested Adam's records. When the prosecutor failed to timely produce them,
Defendant moved to compel their discovery, but then withdrew the request and
informed the court that the parties had settled the matter (R. 41-46 & 53).
Defendant likewise asserts that "[w]e know that the State also changed its
approach in mid-trial, from objecting to any evidence of Adam's abuse to calling
him as a State's witness." See Br.Aplt. at 32. Again, the record is otherwise. The
prosecutor told the defense before trial that he intended to call Adam as a witness in
its case-in-chief (R. 341-342). Moreover, during trial, the prosecutor never objected
to questions about Adam's assaults.
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trial, defense counsel asked the interviewing detective if he had specifically
questioned Adam about the light bulb incident:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And you specifically asked [Adam] if he had ever
stuck a light bulb in [M.B/s] rectum.
DETECTIVE: Yes.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: And you asked him that because, is it fair to say, the
information that you reviewed in preparation for Adam's report
indicated that Adam had done the light bulb issue.
DETECTIVE: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: There wasn't any information in the reports that
you reviewed, prior to these interviews with Matt and Adam, that
indicated [Defendant] had did [sic] the light bulb issue.
DETECTIVE: Not to my recollection, no.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: But you are aware of [the forensic interviewer's]
report where she has in her report that [M.B.] said [Defendant] did it.
DETECTIVE: Yes.

...

DEFENSE COUNSEL: But it sounds like you wanted — at least you wanted
to follow up on the information about Adam doing it, and that's why
you asked him.
DETECTIVE: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And he denied it.
DETECTIVE: Yes.
(R416: 35-36). This exchange evidences defense counsel's pretrial knowledge that
information existed that suggested that Adam, not Defendant, used the light bulb.
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And though Adam may have initially denied this in 2006, no one but Adam and
Defendant were implicated in M.B/s assaults.
When Adam testified, he agreed that he had not disclosed all of his sexual
misconduct in the 2006 interview. He believed, however, that he did disclose the
light bulb incident, but concealed a different incident involving "a hypodermic
needle and Novocain" (R416: 50-51 & 58-60). In the 2006 interview, he also did not
disclose what he knew of Defendant's abuse of M.B. (R416: 58-60).
A week or two before Defendant's trial, Adam was re-interviewed by a
different detective (R416: 59-60). This 2008 interview occurred after Adam was
convicted. Adam discussed all of his sexual misconduct and revealed that M.B. told
him Defendant was "bothering" her (id.). Though Defendant claims that the
prosecutor concealed this second interview until trial, see Br.Aplt. 24, Defendant's
trial counsel specifically referred to it in his opening statement:
This time, the interview takes place February 20 th , 2008, seven days
ago. It is conducted by Sgt. Travis Peterson. Sgt. Peterson is a sergeant
with the DA's office. He interviews Adam, and he also interviews
another lady by the name of Jody.
(R414: 107). These facts support that Defendant was fully aware or should have
been fully aware before trial that Adam likely anally raped M.B. with a light bulb.
See Tillman, 2005 UT 56, % 40 (recognizing Brady not violated if defendant knows of
undisclosed report prior to trial). See also United States v. Jeffers, 570 F.3d 557, 573
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(4th Cir. 2009) ("[Wjhere exculpatory information is not only available to the
defendant but also lies in a source where a reasonable defendant would have
looked, a defendant is not entitled to the benefit of the Brady doctrine") (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Graham, 484 F.3d 413,417 (6th Cir.
2007) (" [T]here is no Brady violation... if the information was available to him from
another source"); United States v. Coplen, 565 F.3d 1094,1097 (8th Cir. 2009) ("The
government does not suppress evidence in violation of Brady by failing to disclose
evidence in which the defendant had access through other channels.") (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
In any case, as the trial court correctly found, regardless of whether
Defendant was fully aware of these facts before trial, he was fully aware of them at
trial and had a fair opportunity to use them to his advantage (R. 480-483). Indeed,
the defense impeached M.B. sufficiently that the jury acquitted him of the three anal
penetration counts. See Statement of the Case at 7; Statement of Facts at 17. See also
Bisner, 2001 UT 99, \ 33 (holding no Brady violation established where "the defense
had the opportunity to use the evidence to its advantage at trial").
Defendant claims that the trial court found the Brady issue was unpreserved
and denied the new trial motion, because defense counsel failed to seek a mid-trial
continuance. See Br.Aplt. at 20 & 40. The claim lacks merit. The trial court did
correctly note that Defendant's post-verdict claim of being "blind-sided" was belied
30

by his failure to claim surprise and seek a continuance during trial (R. 481).
However, the trial court did : I deny Defendant's Brady claim because ___
continuance was sought (R. 480). The court instead considered this fact with the
totality of other facts in i tiling on the merits (R. 480-485). See State v. Workman, 635

surprise).

.

The court also noted, in addressing the materiality of the evidence, that it did
not constitute direct impeachment of a charged offense (R. 483-484). Thus, even if
the defense "had labored throughout the trial under the illusion that the victim had
continued to mistakenly attribute the light i^.r incident . • [i /vionddrij, :he jury
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prejudicial (R. 484-485). See Eisner, 2001 UT 99,138; Pinder, 2005 UT15, ^ 33 (both
holding no Brady violation where impeachment evidence not material).
In sum, Brady was not violated and a new trial was not warranted.

THE TRIAL COURT'S PARTIAL DEFERRAL OF DEFENDANT'S
RULE 412 MOTION DID NOT DENY HIM CONFRONTATION,
WHERE HE WAS ALLOWED TO FULLY QUESTION M.B. AND
ADAM ABOUT ADAM'S ASSAULTS
Defendant claims that his right of confrontation was violated when the trial
court failed to fully grant his motion iii limine to admit evidence pursuant to rule
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412, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE. Br.Aplt. at 34-37. Defendant alleges that the lack of a
''full ruling" prevented him from presenting his "best defense" in his opening
statement and, thereby, denied him confrontation. Id.
The issue should not be considered, because it is not preserved. The merits
should also not be considered, because Defendant fails to marshal the facts
supporting the trial court's decision to partially defer its ruling.

Moreover,

Defendant fails to accurately relate what subsequently occurred at trial.
Alternatively, if the merits are considered, confrontation arises only in the context of
witness examination, not opening statement. Here, Defendant was allowed to fully
confront both M.B. and Adam about Adam's assaults and was allowed to elicit more
details of those assaults than permitted under rule 412 or its exception. In sum, no
confrontation issue exists.
* * *

Rule 412(a), the rape shield rule, bars admission of a victim's past activities
"that involve actual physical conduct that imply sexual intercourse or sexual
conduct." State v. Tarrats, 2005 UT 50, | 22, 122 P.3d 581 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). See also State v. Clark, 2009 UT App 252,114,

P.3d

(same). In adopting rule 412, the Utah Supreme Court "recognized and agreed
with the general consensus among courts that an alleged victim's prior sexual
conduct 'is simply not relevant to any issue in the rape [or other sexual crimes]
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prosecution/" Tarrats, 2005 UT 50, ^ 21 (quoting advisory note) (other citation and
internal quotations omitted).

Even where such evidence may be marginally

relevant, it may still be excluded under rule 403, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, given its
""unusual propensity' to unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead the Jury and .
"distort the j ui v 's deliberative process.'" Tarn its, 2005 1 J 1 50, If 21 (quoting ad v isory
note) (other cil ai ion and ii il ernal qi :iol ai ion marks omitted) See also Clark, 2009 UT
App 252, Tf 14 (same).
Rule 4 i 2 'safeguards the alleged victim from the invasion of privacy [and]
potential embarrassment
details
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The rule's protections apply whether the sexual behavior evidence is "offered as
substantive evidence or for impeachment/' Id.
Subsection 412(b)(3) provides an exception to the rule. Subsection (b)(3) states
that specific instances of a victinVs sexual behavior are admissible, where the
evidence i s "otherwise admissible ui ider these r i iles[, ai id its exclusion] w ould
v i o l a t e the cv:
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before evidence of a victim's sexual behavior may be admitted under the exception,
a defendant must "demonstrate both that the evidence was not prohibited by any
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other rule of evidence and also that its exclusion would violate his constitutional
rights. Clark, 2009 UT App 252, f 15.
Here, Defendant claims his Sixth Amendment's right of confrontation is at
issue. A defendant's right of confrontation —the right to present evidence and
confront witnesses —"is not without limitation" and must necessarily " b o w to
accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process." See Michigan
v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145,149 (1991) (discussing confrontation in context of state rape
shield statute) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Clark, 2009
UT App 252, f 16 (same). The right "guarantees an opportunity for effective crossexamination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to
whatever extent, the defense might wish," Delaware v. Fensterer, A74t U.S. 15, 20
(1985). Consequently, under the Confrontation Clause, "[tjrial judges retain wide
latitude to limit reasonably a criminal defendant's right to cross-examine a witness
based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of
the issues." Lucas, 500 U.S. at 149 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
See also UTAH R. EVID. 403. The right of confrontation is violated, however, if a court
prohibits a defendant from "'engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination
designed to show a proto-typical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby
to expose the jury to the facts from which [it] . . . could appropriately draw
inferences relating to the reliability of the witnesses.'" Clark, 2009 UT App 252, ^f 16
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(quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673,680 (1986)) (brackets and omission in
original).
The merits oi Defendant's confrontation claim shun id not be considered,
:•'_*! „;Li-j me i — .:f ::- :.. . ; :u-cr\ou .;; : trie facts are not marshaled, i:\en :t :he
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more. He not only engaged in appropriate cross-examination to show M.B/s bia s,
motive, or inconsistency, but was also allowed to elicit details of M.B/s sexual
behavior far beyond what is permitted under rule 412 or its (b)(3) exception.
A.

The merits should not be considered, because the issue is not
preserved and the facts are not marshaled.
Defendant moved in limine to admit evidence ui M.D - U/^/o forensic

interview, in which she discussed Defendant's and Adam's assaults (R. 92-103).
Defendant recognized that rule 412 prohibited him from introducing details of the
victim's sexual behavior with Adam, but argued that he should be allowed to
questi- := • ;.:>. ..^ oin an\ • • ..s, native, or inconsistency f kl I . 4_:.;. •*_:-- • . :\c trial
( • • • • t agreed.. The coin t n ileci that Defendant • could generally cross-examine M.B.
and other witnesses about M.B/s bias, motive, and material inconsistencies (R217:
27-46). See Statement of the Case, supra.
Beyond this, the court explained that it needed to wait until trial to rule on
more specific rule 412 objections because questions and objections concerning M.B/s
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disclosures had to be evaluated in context (R217: 27-30 & 41-46). The court opined
that it believed that questions could be artfully framed to avoid rule 412's
prohibitions and still probe the areas Defendant wished to examine (R217: 45-46).
Defendant agreed and stated more than once that delaying further ruling until trial
was appropriate (R217: 28-30 & 42). Just before trial, the court's extensive oral
ruling was reduced to a short written ruling (R. 265-267). See Add. C. Because
Defendant did not object to the court's deferred handling of the rule 412 motion, he
may not challenge the lack of a "full" pretrial ruling for the first time on appeal. See
Patrick; 2009 UT App 226, ^f 12 (affirming failure to preserve below waives
consideration of merits on appeal).
The merits should also not be considered, because Defendant fails to marshal
the facts surrounding the rule 412 motion. See United Park City Mines Co., 2006 UT
35, %^ 24-27. Defendant does not marshal significant procedural facts —that he
agreed with the deferred ruling and did not seek further ruling at trial. He also does
not marshal significant substantive facts — that he was permitted to freely crossexamine M.B. and Adam about Adam's assaults and elicited details of M.B.'s sexual
behavior beyond that permitted by rule 412 or its (b)(3) exception.
Specifically, Defendant fails to acknowledge the following facts. In his
opening statement, defense counsel explained the defense theory— that M.B.
truthfully described her abuse, but falsely accused Defendant to protect Adam, who
36

committed the crimes. See discussion, supra. Defense counsel told tl le jui \ tl iat M.B.
"doesn't give a darn about" Defendant and lh.it her .leeiisatkms wvrv "oldfashioned vindictiveness" (R414: 111). The second time the defense referred to M.B's
sexual behavior with Adam was in cross-examining Matt, M.B/s brother. Defense
counsel asked Matt what he knew of Adam's abuse of M.B. and Matt replied, Adam
"got in trouble years and years before, back hi \\V>t \ alley when [Defendant] was
* • :- a a!" : ' - •
LhdL Aao- -

. vu>^-v *u\v i d^koo *..-•:; .--. nat occurred and Matt said

- o \i ;;

-, .•--. -rv:ely (R41 5: 22-24). C »'i i re •: N tl: le defense

again asked Matt what Adam did to M.B. and, again without v r-\i\ tiuii, Matt
responded: "Adam would go in [M.B/s] room and like touch her with his hands,
and that he would like masturbate at the same time while touching her" (R415: 42).
Following this testimony, the prosecutor asked M.B, if Adam, ever touched
her sexually (R415: 50)

1 1 lis vv as 1 1 le first ti n le tl iat the prosecutor referred to

Adam's abi ise, Withoutpro\ iding the detai Is of w 1 iat. \dai i 11 tad doi i.e to 1 t.ei , M.B.
replied that Adam abused her when she was six or seven, that M.B. told her mother,
that Adam stopped, but then touched her again "a couple of times'7 before he finally
stopped (R415: 50-51). M.B. explained that Adam and Defendant never sexually
assaulted her at the same Lrvie (is. 4 i 3. ;>_!. See also Statement of Facts at 10 & n.6. The
prober =. : . •-•

• *.

a d>./ ad; dM ;.» -,, eiu a;i\ .uiiuivnces between Adam's and

Defendant's assa -\l< ,::• d again w e - ». \ vov-...:*••- ; h e ^ ^ •- d detail-. V :
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what she felt were the differences, i.e., Adam's compassion and Defendant's
ruthlessness (R415: 52-55). See also Statement of Facts at 9 & 12-13.
On cross-examination, defense counsel extensively questioned M.B about her
prior allegation that Defendant inserted a light bulb into her anus (R415: 75-83).
Though the trial court had ruled that Defendant could question M.B. about material
inconsistencies regarding the charged crimes, the light bulb incident was not a
charged crime (R217: 43-44). Nevertheless, without obtaining a further ruling or
incurring additional objection, Defendant questioned M.B. in detail about her prior
accusation, including the drawing she made of the incident (R415: 75-83). Defense
counsel further questioned M.B. about her preliminary hearing statement that
Defendant used only two objects to penetrate her, an "M & M" container and dildo
(R415: 79 & 109). M.B. asserted that she knew the defense would question her about
this discrepancy and she was prepared to explain it (R415: 79-81). She said that
sometime after she made the original accusation in the forensic interview, she
worked on treatment packets that forced her to detail Adam's abuse (id.). In the
course of doing that, she realized that it was Adam who inserted the light bulb into
her, not Defendant (id.)}3

13

M.B. told the prosecutor and, as a result, the light bulb object rape charge
was dropped from the Information before the preliminary hearing. See Statement of
Case at 4-5; Statement of Facts at 16.
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<• ier JcLiiis of Adam's

assaults- son t.e that were discussed i 1 t. the forensic ii iterview and some tl iat w ei e
not. No objections were raised to this questioning. Defense counsel asked M.B. if
Adam also inserted a dildo in her anus and how many times he did that (R415: 8182). M.B. described what he did (id.). Defense counsel asked M.B. if Adam had
performed oral sex on her and she said he had (R415: 90). Defense counsel asked if
-M'- .iu-i j^cTi,-:v.i.v. ;Tcii sex on Adam and >!..>. said siienad (id.). Defense counsel

(R415: -)1). She explained that ' J .-

*: ! .. J * \ -M- \ ,u;r \\\\ ; -:p-- h - -

:P it

Defendant "took [her] virginity" (R415:91). Defense counsel asked her if Adam had
inserted his fingers into her rectum and she said he had (R415: 91-92).
During an ensuing lunch recess, the court informed counsel that a juror had
SL;LVHULC

i a question — a procedure the court allowed — asking why !\ LB. j\c nut tell
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The answer was that years before, Christina had called M.B. a liar whei t, M.B. said
Defendant molested her. See Statement of Facts at 9 & n.4. The defense objected to
this answer because the prior bad act had been deemed irrelevant and inadmissible
in the pretrial rule 412 hearing (id.). The court reminded defense counsel that the
defense hc-d r-.v:: ^v\>j]\ «.•-. uii- ;,.Li::;-.^ in questioning M.B.:
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We have left open the issue what this court's rulings might be on 412
objections, and no one has made one. So, we've gone fast and far past
what otherwise might be protections entitled to [M.B.] pursuant to rule
412.
(R415: 112). Defense counsel agreed (id.). The court stated that accordingly, the
prosecutor should have "some leeway" in questioning M.B. about why she did not
tell Christina (zd.).M
After the jury returned, the prosecutor asked M.B. why she did not tell and
she responded that Christina had called her a liar when she had "told on
[Defendant], about something that happened in the past"(R415:113). Throughout
the rest of the trial, defense counsel continued, without objection, to question
witnesses about M.B.'s and Adam's sexual behavior (R415:171; R416:28-29,33-37, &
58-60).
In sum, Defendant did not object to the court's deferred handling of the rule
412 motion, therefore, the issue is not preserved. Defendant also fails to marshal the
facts concerning the rule 412 motion, pretrial ruling, and related trial evidence.
These failures justify summary affirmance.

14

Defendant wholly mischaracterizes the bench conference. He states that it
addressed "what questioning would be allowed regarding allegations against Adam
and [M.B.'s] differing attitudes toward Adam" and Defendant. Br.Aplt. at 16-17 &
29-30.
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: \ lternati \ - ely, no denial of confrontation occurred.
Defendant claims that -the trial court's failure to make a "full" pretrial :n ilirig

on his rule 412 motion deprived him of confrontation. Br.Aplt. at 34-37. He asserts
that the court's failure to fully rule deprived him of the opportunity to make a better
opening, which would have led to a better defense. Id. at 37. The claim has no merit.
:.-. viy.i : .>f confrontation "guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal
proses
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U.S. Const, amend. VI)). An opening statement does not implicate the right.
In any case, here the gist of the defense theory was fully stated in opening.
See supra at 26. During the ensuing trial, Defendant was allowed to question M.B.
about any bias or motive she had to falsely accuse Defendant. And, as discussed, he
wasab-^iicv

"* - o x ^ -ne \I.i> .»::.i-. ii-ior^'. ip—L^LOiU .ming any inconsistency

in her statements. Defendai if: was a] so allowed to full> qi lestion M.B arid other
witnesses about Adam's assaults and, without limitation, to elicit details of M.B/s
sexual behavior. See discussion of marshaled facts, supra. In sum, the predicate for a
rule 412(b)(3) confrontation claim does not exist, because evidence of M.B/s sexual
behavior was not e \ a u a e d .
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III.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PERMITED THE DATES IN
THE INFORMATION TO BE AMENDED
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the
prosecution to amend the end date of the charged period from December 2000 to
September 2001. See Br.Aplt. at 37-39. See also Add. B&D (Informations). Defendant
claims the nine-month change was "not justif [ied]" because M.B. was "unequivocal"
that she was "nine, or perhaps had just turned ten" when Defendant began
assaulting her. Id. The merits of the issue should not be considered, because the
issue is not preserved and the facts are not marshaled. Alternatively, it lacks merit.
A. The merits should not be considered, because the issue is not
preserved and the facts are not marshaled.
Defendant claims he objected to the amendment below. Br.Aplt. at 37. He did
not.

He filed no written objection to the prosecutor's motion to amend the

information and there is no other evidence that he objected (R. 339-340).
Consideration of the merits is, therefore, waived. See Patrick, 2009 UT App 226, Tf 12.
Even if the issue were preserved, Defendant fails to marshal the facts
supporting the trial court's ruling. Instead, Defendant summarily asserts that M.B.
"changed her story [of when the crimes occurred] only when it became apparent if
she continued to claim she was nine, she must be lying." See Br.Aplt. at 39. Though
unacknowledged by Defendant, the marshaled facts prove otherwise.
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Informations stated that the sexual assaults occurred in the Elm Street family home
(R. 1-3 & 56-63).

M.B. testified at the preliminary hearing that she thought

Defendant moved into the home when she was nine or had just turned ten, i e., 1999
or Z '*?i -: Ko4: -'. \ *• • <: _4~_j ;. \ Lsridi: R^. : >. .- oider sister, testified at the preliminary
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produced police records that supported Mariah's recall of the dates and showed that
he still lived in New York in 1999 and much of 2000 (R. 225-258). Defendant also
agreed that after he left New York in late 2000 or early 2001, he moved to Utah and
shortly thereafter moved into the Elm Street family home (R416: 81).
"J • v- .To-WLur: .v- L.\->*--d in- -•

t,

L- .v :; i .^ .» *\ "i roa:izea the;: sr;e must

have been a year older, eleven years-old when Defendant li\ ed ii itl tehoi ne (R. 260).
The prosecutor then moved to amend the end date charged in the Information to
correctly reflect the time period that Defendant lived in the home (R. 259-264 & 339340). Defendant did not object to the pretrial amendment (R. 339-340). Defendant's
failure to mar-ru-ii tnese racts supports summary rejection of his claim. See United
Park City Mining Co., 2006 1 1 1 35, %*k 24-27.
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B.

Alternatively, the Information was properly amended.
Alternatively, the claim has no merit. Rule 4(d), UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE, permits an information to be amended "at any time before verdict if no
additional or different offense is charged and the substantial rights of the defendant
are not prejudiced/ 7 See Add. A.
Time is generally not a statutory element. State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773
(Utah 1985). And children are often unreliable in recalling dates in describing
events that occur over a period of time. See State v. Taylor, 2005 UT 40,f 12,116 P.3d
360; State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028, 1033 (Utah 1991); Robbins, 709 P.2d at 773.
Defendant attempts to distinguish these cases because M.B. testified at the
preliminary hearing that she was sure she was nine or ten when the assaults began.
See Br.Aplt. at 39. The argument is of no avail. In the same hearing, M.B. testified
that the assaults took place after Defendant left New York and moved into the Elm
Street home (R64: 9, 20 & 23-24). This is exactly the type of "temporal reference
point" that children can more reliably identify than a precise year or an exact age.
Robbins, 709 P.2d at 773.
Nor does it make any difference that M.B/s realization that she must have
been older resulted in part from Defendant's "alibi/' See Br.Aplt. at 39. The purpose
of "notice-of-alibi" statutes is to "preven[t] "last minute surprises and enable[e] the
prosecution to make a full and thorough investigation." State v. Masetas, 815 P.2d
44
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charges, tho-L- i v-^-': ' ^ ' ; - "• • p^i: nissible becau se a defei idant '1 las no si -at i itory
or constitutional right to a charge framed so as to facilitate an alibi defense.'" State
v. Northcutt, 2006 UT App 269,1f 17,139 P.3d 1066 (quoting Wilcox, 808 P.2d at 1033)
(brackets in original).
Defendant7^ claim of error also fails because he does allege prejudice. See
Br.Apt:* at i', - ;^. See also UlAli K. • ! . u. i\ • * *i; (amendment permissible unless
-u: '-u " J, :,>i :*: : -.-• "

••- kvd.

\J^\ -J •, \is>. : Vie- • -K- •: i \ \ IT

der.i-^-•' • ,: '•• • • '• ' • : - ^ v - ^ . v j l J t - M \ M• v/>, r v- ! '-. .•.-!'*? M-- h *• >-->; h o c ' :i r p f >

!

MVV

that he did not assault her. Under this theory, M.B/s exact age was of little import.
See Taylor, 2005 UT 40, \ 5 (recognizing where defendant denies crime, change in
time frame of allegations does not violate his substantial rights).

DEFENDANT FAILS TO ESTABLISH THAT HIS TRIAL
COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE
, Defendant asserts that i f any issue is foui id to be unpreserved, theproced i iral
default should be excused, because his trial counsel was ineffective "for not doing
something more/ 7 See Br.Aplt. at 40-41. The issue should be summarily rejected for
inadequate briefing. See Green, 2004 UT 76, W 11-15.
"To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate
botl I that 'com tsel's perfoi mance was deficit•:;
45
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standard of reasonable professional judgment/ and that 'counsel's deficient
performance was prejudicial/" State v. Perry, 2009 UT App 5 1 , f 1 1 , 204 P.3d 880
(quoting Litherland, 2000 UT 76, If 19 & citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984)). A reviewing court "'must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the
defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Benvenuto v. State, 2007
UT 53, t 19,165 P.3d 1195 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). "[A]n ineffective
assistance claim succeeds only when no conceivable legitimate tactic or strategy can
be surmised from counsel's actions." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461,468 (Utah App.
1993).
Moreover, "proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative
matter but must be a demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877
(Utah 1993). To establish prejudice, a defendant must affirmatively establish that
"'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'" State v. Templin,
805 P.2d 182,188 (Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). "And as with the
first prong of the Strickland standard, there is a 'strong presumption' that the
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outcome of the particular proceeding is reliable/ 7 Benvenuto, 2007 UT 53, *f 23
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S: at 699).
Though both prongs of the Strickland standard must be established, both need
not be analyzed. In resolving an ineffectiveness claim, "an appellate court may skip
to the second prong of the Strickland standard and determine that the
ineffectiveness, if any, did not prejudice the trial's outcome/ 7 State v. Goddard, 871
P.2d 540, 545 (Utah 1994) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).
Ignoring this authority, Defendant simply presumes that any failure to
preserve an issue is necessarily deficient and prejudicial. See Br.Aplt. at 40-41. This
wholly fails to satisfy the briefing requirements of rule 24(a)(9) and justifies
summary rejection of the claim.
In any case, Defendant's appellate issues have no merit, see Points I-III, supra,
and, consequently, any failure of counsel to preserve them cannot be prejudicial.
The only specific deficiency Defendant identifies is that his counsel failed to seek a
mid-trial continuance after it became "clear . . . that the State had failed to disclose
exculpatory evidence,77 that is, after M.B. revealed "the misattribution of the light
bulb incident/ 7 Br.Aplt. at 40. The trial court did not rely on defense counsel's
failure to seek a continuance to bar the Brady claim. The court simply noted that
counsel had not claimed surprise and sought a remedy during trial (R. 481). The
court then proceeded to fully consider the merits of the Brady claim before rejecting
47

it (R. 477-487). See Point I, supra, & Add. E. In sum, seeking a mid-trial continuance
would not have changed the Brady ruling and, therefore, no prejudice exists.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted November 2, 2009.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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Addenda

Addendum A

Utah R. App. P. 24. Briefs
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment or order is sought to be
reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be
set out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover.
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references.
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, rules, statutes and other
authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited.
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of appellate review with
supporting authority; and
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court.
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative of
the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) of this rule.
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall
follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in
accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule.
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of
the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the
argument is arranged.
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record
evidence that supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall
state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award.
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(a)(l 1) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this paragraph. The addendum
shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound
separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of:
(a)(l 1)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance cited in the brief but not
reproduced verbatim in the brief;
(a)(l 1)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion; in all cases any court opin-
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ion of central importance to the appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service;
and
(a)(l 1)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the determination of the appeal, such
as the challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the
court's oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule,
except that the appellee need not include:
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant; or
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the appellant. The appellee may
refer to the addendum of the appellant.
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the appellee has crossappealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the crossappeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the
reply brief shall conform to the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs
may be filed except with leave of the appellate court,
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such
as "the employee," "the injured person,' "the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the original record as paginated
pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber. References to exhibits
shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy,
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected.
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs
shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases
involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs.
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a notice of appeal shall be
deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to
file two briefs. No brief shall exceed 50 pages, and no party's briefs shall in combination exceed 75 pages.
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised in the appeal.
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, which shall respond to
the issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and present the issues raised in the cross-appeal.
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross-Appellee, which
shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief of Cross-Appellant.
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall reply to the Brief of Cross-Appellee.
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(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the court for good cause shown may upon
motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds the limitations of this rule. The motion shall state with specificity
the issues to be briefed, the number of additional pages requested, and the good cause for granting the motion. A
motion filed at least seven days before the date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be
accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before the date the brief is due and seeking
more than 5 additional pages shall be accompanied by a copy of the draft brief for in camera inspection. If the motion is granted, any responding party is entitled to an equal number of additional pages without further order of the
court. Whether the motion is granted or denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court.
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply
briefs.
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to the attention of a party
after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise the
clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the
Supreme Court. An original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference
either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall state the
reasons for the supplemental citations. The body of the letter must not exceed 350 words. Any response shall be
made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited.
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess
attorney fees against the offending lawyer.
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Utah R. Crim. P. 4. Prosecution of Public Offenses
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted by indictment or information sworn to by a person
having reason to believe the offense has been committed.
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense for which the defendant is being prosecuted by using the
name given to the offense by common law or by statute or by stating in concise terms the definition of the offense
sufficient to give the defendant notice of the charge. An information may contain or be accompanied by a statement
of facts sufficient to make out probable cause to sustain the offense charged where appropriate. Such things as time,
place, means, intent, manner, value and ownership need not be alleged unless necessary to charge the offense. Such
things as money, securities, written instruments, pictures, statutes and judgments may be described by any name or
description by which they are generally known or by which they may be identified without setting forth a copy.
However, details concerning such things may be obtained through a bill of particulars. Neither presumptions of law
nor matters of judicial notice need be stated.
(c) The court may strike any surplus or improper language from an indictment or information.
(d) The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at any time before verdict if no additional or
different offense is charged and the substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. After verdict, an indictment or information may be amended so as to state the offense with such particularity as to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense upon the same set of facts.
(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required to inform a defendant of the nature and cause
of the offense charged, so as to enable him to prepare his defense, the defendant may file a written motion for a bill
of particulars. The motion shall be filed at arraignment or within ten days thereafter, or at such later time as the court
may permit. The court may, on its own motion, direct the filing of a bill of particulars. A bill of particulars may be
amended or supplemented at any time subject to such conditions as justice may require. The request for and contents
of a bill of particulars shall be limited to a statement of factual information needed to set forth the essential elements
of the particular offense charged.
(f) An indictment or information shall not be held invalid because any name contained therein may be incorrectly
spelled or stated.
(g) It shall not be necessary to negate any exception, excuse or proviso contained in the statute creating or defining
the offense.
(h) Words and phrases used are to be construed according to their usual meaning unless they are otherwise defined
by law or have acquired a legal meaning.
(i) Use of the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive shall not invalidate the indictment or information.
(j) The names of witnesses on whose evidence an indictment or information was based shall be endorsed thereon
before it is filed. Failure to endorse shall not affect the validity but endorsement shall be ordered by the court on
application of the defendant. Upon request the prosecuting attorney shall, except upon a showing of good cause,
furnish the names of other witnesses he proposes to call whose names are not so endorsed.
(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue directing it to appear before the magistrate. Appearance
may be by an officer or counsel. Proceedings against a corporation shall be the same as against a natural person.
Current with amendments received through July 1, 2009.
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Utah R. Crim. P. 24. Motion for New Trial
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of justice if
there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party.
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in support of the motion. If additional time is required to procure affidavits or
evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it deems reasonable.
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made not later than 10 days after entry of the sentence, or within such further
time as the court may fix before expiration of the time for filing a motion for new trial.
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no trial had been held and the former verdict
shall not be used or mentioned either in evidence or in argument.
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Utah R. Evid. 412. Admissibility of Alleged Victim's Sexual Behavior or Alleged Sexual Predisposition
(a) Evidence Generally Inadmissible. The following evidence is not admissible in any criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c);
(1) evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior; and
(2) evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual predisposition.
(b) Exceptions. The following evidence is admissible, if otherwise admissible under these rules:
(1) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim offered to prove that a person other
than the accused was the source of the semen, injury, or other physical evidence;
(2) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim with respect to the person accused of
the sexual misconduct offered:
(A) by the accused to prove consent; or
(B) by the prosecution; and
(3) evidence the exclusion of which would violate the constitutional rights of the defendant.
(c) Procedure to Determine Admissibility.
(1) A party intending to offer evidence under paragraph (b) must:
(A) file a written motion at least 14 days before trial specifically describing the evidence and stating the purpose
for which it is offered unless the court, for good cause, requires a different time for filing or permits filing during trial; and
(B) serve the motion on all parties. The prosecutor shall timely notify the alleged victim or, when appropriate,
the alleged victim's guardian or representative.
(2) Before admitting evidence under this rule, the court must conduct a hearing in camera and afford the alleged
victim and parties a right to attend and be heard. The motion, related papers, and the record of the hearing must be
sealed and remain under seal unless the court orders otherwise.

© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Addendum B

N U I I VISTHICTCOURT
Third Judicial District
LOHRA L. MILLER
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
ROBERT G.NEILL, 8439
Deputy District Attorney
111 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

VIMUIIHttL

MAY 2 5 2007
SALT}LAKE,COUNTy—,
I "\

.

Dapufy ClerR"'

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

Assigned to: R. Neill (Tuesday)
DAO# 06019648

Plaintiff,
-vsJASON TYLER HAMBLIN
DOB 08/19/80,
Gunnison Prison
067-74-0558
OTN
SO# 0258073
Defendant.

AMENDED
INFORMATION

Case No. 061907251FS

The undersigned under oath states on information and belief that the defendant
committed the crimes of:

COUNT I
RAPE OF A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm Street, in Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, on or about January 1, 1999 through December 31, 2000, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 5, Section 402.1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a party to the offense, had sexual intercourse with a child
under the age of 14 years at the time of the offense.

COUNT II
RAPE OF A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm Street, in Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, on or about January 1, 1999 through December 31, 2000, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 5, Section 402.1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a party to the offense, had sexual intercourse with a child
under the age of 14 years at the time of the offense.
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COUNT III
RAPE OF A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm Street, in Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, on or about January 1, 1999 through December 31, 2000, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 5, Section 402.1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a party to the offense, had sexual intercourse with a child
under the age of 14 years at the time of the offense.

COUNT IV
OBJECT RAPE OF A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm Street , in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about January 1, 1999 through December 31, 2000, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 402.3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
in that the defendant, JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a party to the offense, caused
penetration of the genital or anal opening of a child who is under the age of 14 years by
any foreign object, substance, instrument, or device, with intent to cause substantial
emotional or bodily pain to the child or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person.

COUNT V
OBJECT RAPE OF A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm Street , in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about January 1, 1999 through December 31, 2000, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 402.3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
in that the defendant, JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a party to the offense, caused
penetration of the genital or anal opening of a child who is under the age of 14 years by
any foreign object, substance, instrument, or device, with intent to cause substantial
emotional or bodily pain to the child or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person.

COUNT VI
SODOMY UPON A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm Street , in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about January 1, 1999 through December 31, 2000, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 403.1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
in that the defendant, JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a party to the offense, engaged in a
sexual act upon or with a child under the age of 14, involving the genitals or anus of the
actor or the child and the mouth or anus of either person, regardless of the sex of either
participant.
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COUNT VII
SODOMY UPON A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm Street , in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about January 1, 1999 through December 31, 2000, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 403.1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
in that the defendant, JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a party to the offense, engaged in a
sexual act upon or with a child under the age of 14, involving the genitals or anus of the
actor or the child and the mouth or anus of either person, regardless of the sex of either
participant.

COUNT VIII
SODOMY UPON A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm Street , in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about January 1, 1999 through December 31, 2000, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 403.1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
in that the defendant, JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a party to the offense, engaged in a
sexual act upon or with a child under the age of 14, involving the genitals or anus of the
actor or the child and the mouth or anus of either person, regardless of the sex of either
participant.

COUTN IX
SODOMY UPON A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm Street , in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about January 1, 1999 through December 31, 2000, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 403.1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
in that the defendant, JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a party to the offense, engaged in a
sexual act upon or with a child under the age of 14, involving the genitals or anus of the
actor or the child and the mouth or anus of either person, regardless of the sex of either
participant.

COUNT X
SODOMY UPON A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm Street , in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about January 1, 1999 through December 31, 2000, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 403.1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
in that the defendant, JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a party to the offense, engaged in a
sexual act upon or with a child under the age of 14, involving the genitals or anus of the
actor or the child and the mouth or anus of either person, regardless of the sex of either
participant.
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COUNT XI
AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ABUSE OF A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm
Street, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about Jamuary 1, 1999 through
December 31, 2000, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 404.1(4), Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a
party to the offense, touched the anus, buttocks or genitalia of a child, the breasts of a
female child, or otherwise took indecent liberties with a child, or caused the child to take
indecent liberties with the defendant or another with the intent to cause substantial
emotional or bodily pain to any person, or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person regardless of the sex of any participant, and the child was younger
than 14 years of age, further that the defendant did during the course of committing the
Sexual Abuse of a Child use or threaten the victim by the use of a dangerous weapon, or
used force, duress, violence, intimidation, coercion, menace, or threat of harm or the
Sexual Abuse of a Child was committed during the course of a kidnapping, or caused
bodily injury or severe psychological injury to the victim during or as a result of the
offense, or the defendant was a stranger to the victim or made friends with the victim for
the purpose of committing the offense, or the defendant used, showed, or displayed
pornography or caused the victim to be photographed in a lewd condition, or the
defendant has been previously convicted of any felony or of a misdemeanor involving a
sexual offense, or the defendant committed the same or similar sexual act upon two or
more victims at the same time or during the same course of conduct, or the defendant
committed, in Utah or elsewhere, more than five separate acts which if committed in
Utah would constitute an offense described in Title 76, Chapter 5, and were committed at
the same time, or during the same course of conduct, or before or after the instant
offense, or the defendant occupied a position of special trust in relation to the victim, or
the defendant encouraged, aided, allowed or benefited from acts of prostitution or sexual
acts by the victim with any other person or sexual performance by the victim before any
other person, or the defendant caused the penetration, however slight, of the genital or
anal opening of the child by any part or parts of the human body other than the genitals or
mouth.
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COUNT XII
AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ABUSE OF A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm
Street, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about Jamuary 1, 1999 through
December 31, 2000, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 404.1(4), Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a
party to the offense, touched the anus, buttocks or genitalia of a child, the breasts of a
female child, or otherwise took indecent liberties with a child, or caused the child to take
indecent liberties with the defendant or another with the intent to cause substantial
emotional or bodily pain to any person, or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person regardless of the sex of any participant, and the child was younger
than 14 years of age, further that the defendant did during the course of committing the
Sexual Abuse of a Child use or threaten the victim by the use of a dangerous weapon, or
used force, duress, violence, intimidation, coercion, menace, or threat of harm or the
Sexual Abuse of a Child was committed during the course of a kidnapping, or caused
bodily injury or severe psychological injury to the victim during or as a result of the
offense, or the defendant was a stranger to the victim or made friends with the victim for
the purpose of committing the offense, or the defendant used, showed, or displayed
pornography or caused the victim to be photographed in a lewd condition, or the
defendant has been previously convicted of any felony or of a misdemeanor involving a
sexual offense, or the defendant committed the same or similar sexual act upon two or
more victims at the same time or during the same course of conduct, or the defendant
committed, in Utah or elsewhere, more than five separate acts which if committed in
Utah would constitute an offense described in Title 76, Chapter 5, and were committed at
the same time, or during the same course of conduct, or before or after the instant
offense, or the defendant occupied a position of special trust in relation to the victim, or
the defendant encouraged, aided, allowed or benefited from acts of prostitution or sexual
acts by the victim with any other person or sexual performance by the victim before any
other person, or the defendant caused the penetration, however slight, of the genital or
anal opening of the child by any part or parts of the human body other than the genitals or
mouth.
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COUNT XIII
AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ABUSE OF A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm
Street, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about Jamuary 1, 1999 through
December 31, 2000, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 404.1(4), Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a
party to the offense, touched the anus, buttocks or genitalia of a child, the breasts of a
female child, or otherwise took indecent liberties with a child, or caused the child to take
indecent liberties with the defendant or another with the intent to cause substantial
emotional or bodily pain to any person, or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person regardless of the sex of any participant, and the child was younger
than 14 years of age, further that the defendant did during the course of committing the
Sexual Abuse of a Child use or threaten the victim by the use of a dangerous weapon, or
used force, duress, violence, intimidation, coercion, menace, or threat of harm or the
Sexual Abuse of a Child was committed during the course of a kidnapping, or caused
bodily injury or severe psychological injury to the victim during or as a result of the
offense, or the defendant was a stranger to the victim or made friends with the victim for
the purpose of committing the offense, or the defendant used, showed, or displayed
pornography or caused the victim to be photographed in a lewd condition, or the
defendant has been previously convicted of any felony or of a misdemeanor involving a
sexual offense, or the defendant committed the same or similar sexual act upon two or
more victims at the same time or during the same course of conduct, or the defendant
committed, in Utah or elsewhere, more than five separate acts which if committed in
Utah would constitute an offense described in Title 76, Chapter 5, and were committed at
the same time, or during the same course of conduct, or before or after the instant
offense, or the defendant occupied a position of special trust in relation to the victim, or
the defendant encouraged, aided, allowed or benefited from acts of prostitution or sexual
acts by the victim with any other person or sexual performance by the victim before any
other person, or the defendant caused the penetration, however slight, of the genital or
anal opening of the child by any part or parts of the human body other than the genitals or
mouth.
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COUNT XIV
AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ABUSE OF A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm
Street, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about Jamuary 1, 1999 through
December 31, 2000, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 404.1(4), Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a
party to the offense, touched the anus, buttocks or genitalia of a child, the breasts of a
female child, or otherwise took indecent liberties with a child, or caused the child to take
indecent liberties with the defendant or another with the intent to cause substantial
emotional or bodily pain to any person, or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person regardless of the sex of any participant, and the child was younger
than 14 years of age, further that the defendant did during the course of committing the
Sexual Abuse of a Child use or threaten the victim by the use of a dangerous weapon, or
used force, duress, violence, intimidation, coercion, menace, or threat of harm or the
Sexual Abuse of a Child w7as committed during the course of a kidnapping, or caused
bodily injury or severe psychological injury to the victim during or as a result of the
offense, or the defendant was a stranger to the victim or made friends with the victim for
the purpose of committing the offense, or the defendant used, showed, or displayed
pornography or caused the victim to be photographed in a lewd condition, or the
defendant has been previously convicted of any felony or of a misdemeanor involving a
sexual offense, or the defendant committed the same or similar sexual act upon two or
more victims at the same time or during the same course of conduct, or the defendant
committed, in Utah or elsewhere, more than five separate acts which if committed in
Utah would constitute an offense described in Title 76, Chapter 5, and were committed at
the same time, or during the same course of conduct, or before or after the instant
offense, or the defendant occupied a position of special trust in relation to the victim, or
the defendant encouraged, aided, allowed or benefited from acts of prostitution or sexual
acts by the victim with any other person or sexual performance by the victim before any
other person, or the defendant caused the penetration, however slight, of the genital or
anal opening of the child by any part or parts of the human body other than the genitals or
mouth.

THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:

Detective McNees, M.B., M.B.

n r
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PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your Affiant bases this Information upon the following:
1.
The statement of M.B., DOB 6/17/1990, that when she was approximately 9 years
old, when she lived on Elm Street in Salt Lake County, her older step-brother, JASON TYLER
HAMBLIN began sexually abusing her. She states that he began by touching her breasts and
rubbing her vaginal area. M.B. states that HAMBLIN on separate occasions digitally penetrated
her vagina and would bite her breasts. M.B. states that HAMBLIN had anal intercourse with her
and caused her anus to bleed. M.B. states that HAMBLIN had anal intercourse with her
numerous times. She also states that HAMBLIN put an M&M candy container and a "dildo" in
her anus. M.B. states that HAMBLIN also had vaginal intercourse with her numerous times and
that it hurt and she bled profusely. M.B. states that HAMBLIM put his mouth on her vagina and
would force her to perform oral sex on him. M.B. states that these things occurred numerous
times a week and that HAMBLIN stopped when he went to prison on unrelated charges, around
the time M.B. turned 10 years old in 2000.

Z^^f/T* 1L^£/
Affiant
Subscribed and sworn to before me this c 3 y Q ^
dayofMardi, 2007.

Ps^-

'MAGISTRATE
Authorized for presentment and filing:
LOHRA L. MILLER, District Attorney

J^^J.yUJ^
Deputy District Attorney
October 27, 2006
CGB/om/06019648
Amended/ww/March 26, 2007
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I

Q

Could you tell us about the first time?

A

I just, I remember that I had to hold myself up, like

I had to hold myself on my hands and my knees, and it was so
hard for me to — it felt like — I don't know how to explain
it. Like I was more — I couldn't take myself away from the
situation, and so I was more in tune, I was more there. And he
just started having anal intercourse with me. And I couldn't
go to the bathroom afterwards. And I remember when I tried it
like cracked and bled.
Q

What cracked and bled?

A

My anus.

Q

Did he say anything to you the first time that

happened?
A

He never said anything. All he ever said was, Shh,

be quiet.
Q

By nanal intercoursen what do you mean? What part of

him went into what part of you?
A

His penis went into my anus.

Q

Did that happen once or more than once?

A

It happened more than once. And there were objects

involved sometimes.
Q

Could you tell us about the objects?

A

You know the M&M tubes that the little, mini MSM's

come in? That was shoved up my ass.
Q

Who did that?
16

A

Jason.

Q

Anything else?

A

And a dildo.

0

Where did he put that?

A

My anus.

Q

Did that happen once or more than once?

A

The objects just once. But himself multiple times.

Q

Did he ever put his mouth on any part of your body

other than your vagina? Did he ever put his mouth on your
breasts or anything like that?
MR. NAKAMURA: Judge, I am going to object on the
grounds it is leading. I think he can ask her what else
happened. He has asked her that now. He is starting to lead
her in terms of what particular acts he is contending allegedly
occurred.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q

(By Mr. Neill) Did he ever put his mouth on any other

part of your body?
A

No.

Q

Did you ever do anything to try to get out of the

situation or to prevent him from coming into your room?
A

I had my shoelaces, and I would take my shoelace out

of my shoe. And in my roam there was a wooden handle in the
inside, and there was no lock on the inside. You can only be
locked in from the outside. I took my shoelace and I tied it
1*7

1

Q

2

But there were apparently other objects that he did

stick inside you?

3

A

Yes.

4 I

THE COURT: Could you answer out loud, please.

5

THE WITNESS: Yes.

6
7

Q

(By Mr. Nakamura) Those were two, the M£M container

and the dildo; is that right?

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

I'm sorry to keep having to go over these areas, but

10

I have to ask. But in terms of where he put those, where did

11

he actually put those into?

12

A

My anus.

13

Q

One time each with each object?

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

There were no other objects other than those two?

16

A

No.

17

Q

You have indicated that he also put his penis inside

18

your anus.

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

Did he do that on the same time that he did the MSM

21

or the dildo?

22

A

No.

23

Q

Those were separate occasions?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

Do you recall if when the M&M container or the dildo
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
FINDINGS AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
Case No. 061907251

-vsJASON TYLER HAMBLIN,

Honorable Randall Skanchy
Defendant.

On Thursday, October 11, 2007, a Motion Hearing was held before this Court to
determine the admissibility of evidence which the Defendant seeks to introduce at trial.
The State was represented by Robert G. Neill, Deputy District Attorney for Salt Lake
County, and Mr. Hamblin, who was present, was represented by Mr. Blake Nakamura.
The Court reviewed several motions and memoranda submitted by the Defendant as well
as responses filed by the State. The Court heard arguments and also received evidence in
the form of a portion of an audio-recorded forensic interview ("the interview"') conducted
by Ms. Amanda Wilson of the alleged-victim Mandi Boyd (Ms. Boyd). After resolving
various issues themselves, the parties left the Court with the following issues to decide:
1) Whether statements made by Ms. Boyd regarding an alleged incident of sexual abuse
perpetrated against her when she was four or five years old are admissible; 2) Whether
statements made by Ms. Boyd regarding her feelings about what happens to the
Defendant and another step-brother, Adam Boyd, who is also the subject of a criminal

prosecution, are admissible, and 3) Issues relating to statements made by Ms. Boyd
during the interview which the Defendant claims are inconsistent, and the purpose and
identity of the subject of the interview.
After considering the evidence, arguments and the applicable Utah Rules of
Evidence, the Court makes the following Findings and Order with regard to issues one
and two, but reserves ruling with regard to issue three.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
1.

On October 31, 2006, the State filed numerous sexual-offense charges against the
Defendant in this case. All of the charged offenses are alleged to have occurred
between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2000, when Ms. Boyd was
approximately nine and ten years old.

The Defendant seeks to introduce

statements Ms. Boyd made during the interview where Ms. Boyd referred to an
alleged incident of sexual abuse which occurred nearly thirteen years ago, when
Ms. Boyd was approximately four or five years old. Ms. Boyd stated that this
particular incident was perpetrated by her step-brother, Adam Boyd, then
corrected herself and stated it was the Defendant, not Adam Boyd, who
perpetrated this particular alleged-abuse. This incident was first reported to law
enforcement when Ms. Boyd wras thirteen years old and is barred from
prosecution by the statute of limitations. The Court finds that statements made by
Ms. Boyd regarding this particular incident, when she was four or five years old,
are not the subject of any of the charged offenses and any testimony or crossexamination associated with a matter that's not a subject of the charged
allegations is irrelevant pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 402 and is additionally
barred by Utah Rule of Evidence 412. Therefore any correction or contradiction
on a piece of infonnation associated with this alleged incident that occurred
several years prior are not relevant and are hereby ordered inadmissible.

2.

The second issue the Court considered is whether the Defendant may inquire of
the alleged victim, Ms. Boyd, about statements she made indicative of her anger
towards the Defendant and preference or sympathy towards her step-brother,
Adam Boyd.

The Court finds that any statements associated with bias or

prejudice are subject to cross-examination, are admissible, and are not violative of
Utah Rule of Evidence 412.
3.

The Defendant, pursuant to his Motion, has raised additional issues regarding the
admissibility of evidence pertaining to alleged inconsistencies in Ms. Boyd's
statements and whether Adam Boyd or the Defendant was to be the subject of the
the interview with Ms. Boyd. At the present time, the Court reserves any order
regarding the admissibility of these issues until the issues are raised, if at all,
during trial.
DATED this £<»

day of Newmbfl), 2007'
BY THE COURT:

RAND AIL N{
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE Jt<

Approved as to form:
Blake Nakamura
Attorney for Defendant
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And we would ask the court to rule that, under 412,
mention of the victim1 s sexual -- any sort of abuse would be
irrelevant and confusing for this jury.
THE COURT:

Let me —

just before you — before I let

you go, let's walk through the 412 for just a minute and see
how applicable it is to the four areas we've been talking
about.
412 simply requires that it's not admissible in a
criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct, and it
sets forth the exceptions:

But the evidence is not admissible

-- "evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged
in other sexual behavior."
So what you argue to the court today is that sexual
behavior, that is incident to sexual abuse, that occurred
between her and her brother Adam, as opposed to her stepbrother
Jason, would be barred by this rule; correct?
MR. NEILL:

Correct. And as well as we would ask

that it's irrelevant as well.
THE COURT: All right.

However, as this case

unfolds, you can certainly ask the victim to provide testimony
about sexual abuse that occurred between her and the defendant,
and she is subject to cross-examination as to those incidents.
And indeed she would be subject to any
cross-examination associated with incidents of sexual abuse
perpetrated by —

alleged to have been perpetrated by Jason in
*37

this particular case.
In particular, all of that arises from this
interview, which she has a mixed summary of sexual abuse that
takes place with one individual and with another.

Is that

correct?
MR. NEILL: Correct.
THE COURT: And at the end of it, she at least gives
her own impressions about her particular feelings about why she
would like to see Adam not be punished, but why she doesnTt
care about Jason.

Is that correct?

MR. NEILL: Yes.
THE COURT:
first.

That would be —

let's deal with that one

That would certainly be subject to cross-examination.

And wouldn't it fall within a proscription associated with Rule
412 for barring it, because it simply goes to motive or bias?
Correct?
MR. NEILL: Correct.
THE COURT: And it has to be put in some context.
That context would be, "well, you were interviewed about your
sexual abuse associated with Jason, correct?" And that's how
it comes up.

Is that right?

MR. NEILL: Yes.
THE COURT: Now she'll also be subject to
cross-examination associated with -- well, "when did you first
report this?

How did you report it?" And there's going to
38

I?m trying to think through how this court would work

1

be —

2

through an application of 412 associated with the testimony

3

that comes in.

The beginning of the interview process, the

4 I fact that she was there, that's not going to be prohibited by
5

412. Is that right?

6

MR. NEILL: Yes.

7

THE COURT:

So ultimately, if, in her initial

8

rendition to the therapist, she is there to talk about abuse

9

perpetrated by her brother Adam, it comes in.

I mean that's a

10

statement that's more likely than not to be elicited on direct

11

examination, to which she is subject to cross-examination.

12

Right?

13

MR. NEILL: Yes.

14

THE COURT:

"When did this first come in?"

"In an

15

interview I gave to a sexual counselor, abuse counselor."

16

"When did that interview take place?

17

What did you tell her?"

Mr. Nakamura gets up to cross-examine and says,

18

"didn't you identify someone else, too; that you had been the

19

subject of sexual abuse by other individuals not identified

20

here in this case?"

21

that discussion, "didn't you meet with a counselor specifically

22

to talk about that abuse?" Right?

23

412 at this point?

24
25

And indeed, for the purpose of following

Is that —

have we passed

Where does 412 come in in the context of the court —
Mr. Nakamura wanting to carry forward and the right he has to

confront the witness on that particular issue?
MR. NEILL: Well, anticipating —
THE COURT:

Because it is evidence offered to prove

that the alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior.

That

certainly falls within 412.
MR. NEILL:

I was planning to craft my direct

examination very narrowly, and I mean my attempt would -- I
think I could also ask her, you know, "during that interview,
did you disclose allegations against the defendant?"

I think I

could certainly avoid any mention of the defendant -- or, I
mean, excuse me, of Adam Boyd.
THE COURT:

Then the exception to this, specifically

things associated with why -- there may be argument that Mr.
Nakamura could make today -- and that is evidence of specific
incidents of sexual behavior by the alleged victim offered to
prove that a person other than the accused was the source of
the injury, or other physical evidence.
Typically that arises in the context of, you know, a
single incident; an incident where, in interviews with this
person, "this person, Person X did this," and you can get that
information by examining the sort of physical evidence that may
come from it.

There may be physical evidence available.

But

it still falls within this exception, unless I'm misreading it.
Your only argument is it's not relevant; it's not
charged.
40

1

MR. NEILL:

That also, and I think the way I read

2

that exception is that it is specific to a finding of physical

3

evidence, whether itTs semen, injury -- and I would assume

4

that's referring to bruises or some sort of physical injury

5

and/or other physical evidence.

6

that. We have no one to compare, no semen samples to compare

7

or bruises.

In this case, we have none of

It's very old.

8

My reading of that is that that would fall in to play

9

if there were some physical evidence that they were contesting.

10

THE COURT:

How about then Exception B, evidence of

11

specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim

12

with respect to the person accused of the incident -- that's

13

Mr. Hamblin in this case -- an incident that occurred three or

14

four years prior?

15

by the accused and/or the prosecution brings it up.

16

sense, it's not an issue in this particular case. Anything

17

else you wish to say?

I guess that only comes in if it's offered

18

MR. NEILL: No.

19

THE COURT:

20

In a

You have the last word, if there's

anything further.

21

MR. NAKAMURA:

Judge, I think I'm understanding the

22

court's thoughts on this one. And I want to address the third

23

issue, if you will, that I have raised in the motion.

24

issue we talked about that we may have to wait for trial to

25

develop.

It's the

I understand where the State's concerns are.

I

certainly understand the court's, and I understand 412.
Clearly, it would preclude me from going in to all the details
of the sexual abuse that happened; no question about that.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. NAKAMURA:

What I'm really saying on Point Three

is that I'm comfortable waiting to trial to raise that because
of what I'm anticipating happening; and this is what I think
would occur.
She'll be examined by the State, asked questions
about what she contends Jason did to her.

And then, as she

describes that incident -- but previously she has described
Adam committing acts against her.
It would seem that, under those circumstances, I
certainly am able to cross-examine her about the fact she had
previously said X was considered by Adam.

Is that a fair

reading of what the thought is on at least the third point?
THE COURT:

Yes, the factual scenario you have given

me, though, is one that's in issue.
MR. NAKAMURA:

Right.

Because that's I think why we

have to wait until we get to trial because we have to see
exactly what evidence -- what she says, frankly, and what she
says that there's an allegation against Jason that she has
previously described as being committed by Adam.

And if that's

the case, it would seem to me that right to confront is very
42

1

much real.

And I don't really have to get in to sexual

2

behavior, and I'm not doing it for 412 purposes.

3

But at that point, Ifm entitled to show identity

4

issues. And 412 doesn't even apply, I would argue at that

5

point.

6

But that's really what I was trying to get in with

7

Point Three. And if it comes out that way, I can't see how I

8

wouldn't be permitted to at least bring it to the jury's

9

attention.

That's the only point I wanted to make on Point

10

Three, because I think that clearly is what may well happen.

11

And I want to be able to respond to that.

12

Perhaps the court could give us some guidance if we

13

ever get to that point.

14

contrary, that we could maybe take a break, bring it to the

15

court's attention so the court can make a decision at that

16

point whether it be that we have the

17

it was by Adam on a different occasion.

18

THE COURT:

But I think if it was something

described evidence, that

The parties certainly are subject to

19

impeachment or cross-examination on material inconsistent

20

statements.

21

the factual pattern, if I understand the parties today, that

22

relates to an incident that occurred three or four years prior

23

to what might otherwise be the relevant and germane allegations

24

associated with this particular information.

25

This case presents a particular issue in terms of

And therefore the issue becomes two-fold.

First,

whether or not itfs relevant at all.

Thatfs an argument that I

think is made by the State, and seems to be persuasive, at
least to this court at this time, in terms of the way we're
proceeding.
Any testimony and cross-examination associated with a
matter that's not a subject of these allegations is not
relevant.

And therefore correction or contradiction on a piece

of information associated with incidents that occurred three or
four years prior, and that is not subject to charge in this
particular case, are not relevant and wouldn't be delved into
at the time of trial, precluding the ability to ask questions
associated with that.
However, of course in the context of the testimony,
if the testimony comes in, it is certainly subject to being
reopened, because it's been made a matter of testimony in the
trial proceedings, et cetera.
I think I can —

I think there's some guidelines I

can give you today associated with at least the four points.
I have put four, but it seems that two and three kind
of blend themselves together; maybe it's one and two.

And

here's my preliminary ruling, subject to modification at the
time of trial.
And that is statements associated with the fact of
bias or prejudice are certainly subject to cross-examination.
Therefore, indications she, in the context of an interview,
44

1

indicated she preferred Jason to or as opposed to Adam are

2

subject to examination, direct and/or cross, and would not be

3

violative of 412.

4 I

That, as is present, presently represented by the

5

parties, the burden required by the defendant in this

6

particular case to show relevance associated with

7

cross-examination on an incident that occurred when she was

8

three or four — which is not, as the parties represent to the

9

court today, at least the State does, subject to these

10

allegations in this particular complaint — would not be

11

relevant and would also be barred by Rule 412. And therefore a

12

correction associated with it would be as well.

13

The issue associated with Number three, and that is

14

she went to the interview and stated at the beginning of the

15

interview that this was to be interviewed about somebody other

16

than this individual, and then proceeded, in the interview, to

17

give testimony associated with somebody else, is a little more

18

problematic for the court.

19

And I don't think that todayr at the present posture

20

of where we are, it?s an important issue —

21

the rest of these — but that I can give you the ruling.

22

may just ultimately have to reserve that until we get to trial.

23

it may overshadow
We

But it would seem to me that, in some context, I

24

could foresee that that, artfully handled, could come in

25

without an appropriate objection to Rule 412, or for that — or

412 rules, or for the objection to be sustained if it f s handled
correctly.

Does that help at all?

MR. NAKAMURA:
iianuj-S

Judging is tough, and this is how you

it.

THE COURT: Well, I'm not sure I can —

that's why

I've always recognized the fact that the heavy lifting in any
court is done by the parties who sit at counsel table.
recognize that.

And I

You have tremendous responsibilities and

burdens, and I just get to make the calls from the sidelines as
I may be required to do so.
I have, I think, articulated in a manner in which the
parties can perhaps come to the preparation of an order.

I'll

ask counsel for the State to prepare that order. Mr. Neill,
you'll do that. We'll have that as an order associated with
evidence as it may be received at the time of trial.

Okay?

Are there any other matters we can handle today?
MR. NAKAMURA:

Judge, there is one other matter.

It's kind of a housekeeping one.

It's the trial setting.

We've got the trial setting I think on the 5th of December, and
that was set with the understanding that was a City trial date
but that you guys may be bumped if they had other matters to
go, but —
THE COURT: Well, I'm not certain we bump City
matters if we have somebody in custody and who's charged with
felony offenses, but go ahead.
46
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

Assigned to: R. Neill (Tuesday)
DAO# 06019648

Plaintiff,
-vsJASON TYLER HAMBLIN
DOB 08/19/80,
Gunnison Prison
067-74-0558
OTN
SO# 0258073
Defendant.

AMENDED
INFORMATION

Case No. 061907251FS

The undersigned under oath states on information and belief that the defendant
committed the crimes of:
COUNT I
RAPE OF A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm Street, in Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, on or about January 1, 1999 through September 23, 2001, in violation of Title
76, Chapter 5, Section 402.1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a party to the offense, had sexual intercourse
with a child under the age of 14 years at the time of the offense.
COUNT II
RAPE OF A CHILD, a Firs^Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm Street, i n S ^ t a k e County, Statef^"
of Utah, on or abtfut January 1, 1999 through September 23^2$$!, in violation of Title
76, Chapter/5; Section 402.1, Utah Code Annotate^^9D3, as amended, in that the
defendarjt^JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a partv^Wme offense, had sexual intercourse
with praiild under the age of 14 years at the time of the offense.

AMENDED INFORMATION
DAONo. 06019648
Page 3

COUNT IHf
<*"
SODOMY UPON A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm Street , in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about January 1, 1999 through September 23, 2001, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 403.1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
in that the defendant, JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a party to the offense, engaged in a
sexual act upon or with a child under the age of 14, involving the genitals or anus of the
actor or the child and the mouth or anus of either person, regardless of the sex of either
participant.

COT T

T >
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^ ^ ^ ^
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Salt Lake
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1015 East Elm Street ,
1, 1999
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or anus of either person^r&axdless of the sex of either
participant.
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COUNT IX
SEXUAL ABUSE OF A CHILD, a Second Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm Street, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about January 1, 1999 through September 23, 2001, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 404.1(3), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a party to the offense,
touched the anus, buttocks or genitalia of a child, the breasts of a female child, or
otherwise took indecent liberties with a child, or caused the child to take indecent
liberties with the defendant or another with the intent to cause substantial emotional or
bodily pain to any person, or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person regardless of the sex of any participant, and the child was younger than 14 years
of age.

couNT-ar

^

SEXUAL ABUSE OF A CHILD, a Second Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm Street in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about January 1, 1999 through September 23, 2001, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 404.1(3), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a party to the offense,
touched the anus, buttocks or genitalia of a child, the breasts of a female child, or
otherwise took indecent liberties with a child, or caused the child to take indecent
liberties with the defendant or another with the intent to cause substantial emotional or
bodily pain to any person, or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person regardless of the sex of any participant, and the child was younger than 14 years
of age.

LOHRA L. MILLER
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
ROBERT G. NEILL, Bar No. 8439
Deputy District Attorneys
111 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900
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FILED mmm

ss^i?

^ J u d i c i a l District

\_Xeputy Glsrk

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
STATE'S MOTION TO AMEND DATES
ON INFORMATION

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 061907251
JASON TYLER HAMBLEN,
Hon. Randall N. Skanchy
Defendant.
The State of Utah, by and through its attorney, ROBERT G. NEILL, Deputy District
Attorney, hereby moves this court, pursuant to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 4(d), to permit
the dates on the Information filed in this case, to be amended to read from January 1, 1999
through September 23, 2001.
BRIEF STATEMENT OF PERTINENT FACTS
On April 25, 2006, Child Forensic Interviewer Amanda Wilson interviewed 15 year-old
M.B. at the North Idaho Behavioral Health Juvenile Unit. M.B. disclosed to Ms. Wilson that the
defendant had sexually abused her multiple times when she was a child. M.B. states that these
incidents began when she was nine and lasted until she was ten years old. She stated that they
occurred while she lived at 1015 Elm Avenue in Salt Lake County, a residence which her family
rented. Both of M.B.'s parents passed away prior to this interview and therefore could not be
resources for any dates. Based upon M.B/s statements, the State's Information reads "on or
about January L 1999 through December 31, 2000," which includes M.B.'s ninth year and half
of her tenth year.
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On February 19, 2008, the defendant filed a Notice of Alibi Defense. The defendant
alleges that between April 1999 and October 2000 he had periodic contact with the police in
New York State.
The State has presented this information to M.B. who will testify that the facts supporting
the incidents of abuse are the same but the abuse could have happened into the year 2001.
ARGUMENT
I.

This Court Should Permit the State to Amend the Information Because Utah
Law Permits the State to Amend an Information Any Time Prior to Verdict.
This Court should permit the State to amend the dates in the information because under

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 4(d): "The court may permit an indictment or information to be
amended at any time before verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the
substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced."

Because no additional or different

offenses are being charged, this Court should permit the requested amendment of dates. Utah
appellate courts have upheld trial courts' decisions to permit amending the dates of offenses on
informations prior to verdict, particularly on child sex abuse cases.
In State v. Taylor, 116 P.3d 360 (Utah 2005), the defendant was convicted of Rape of a
Child and Sodomy Upon a Child. The State's Information alleged that the offenses occurred uon
or about November 1, 2002 through January 9, 2003."' Id at 361. During her testimony, the
victim was imprecise on dates and times and the State moved to amend the information,
following her testimony, to expand the range of dates by six months. Id. The trial court allowed
the amendment and the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial courts' decision. The Supreme
Court stated:
We have also acknowledged that in child sexual abuse prosecutions, identifying the
specific date, time, or place of the offense is often difficult owing to the inability of
young victims to provide this information. Responding to the realities of cognitive
development, we have been less demanding of exact times and dates when young
children are involved. We have noted that [i]f we were to hold that ... no offense could
be charged because the alleged victim is too young to testify with certainty concerning

the time, dates, or places where the abuse occurred, we would leave the youngest and
most vulnerable children with no legal protection. An abuser could escape prosecution
merely by claiming that the child's inability to remember the exact dates and places of
the abuse impaired the abuser's ability to prepare an alibi defense. Id at 363.
Similarly in this case, Ms. Boyd is recalling events which occurred when she was a child:
nine and ten years old. Therefore, the State requests the Court to be 'less demanding of exact
times and dates'' and permit the State to amend the information.
II. This Court Should Permit the Amendment Because Time is Not an Element of Any
of the Offenses Charged and Therefore the Substantial Rights of the Defendant are
Not Prejudiced.
This Court should permit the State to amend its information because the State is not
required to prove the precise time the offense was committed and therefore, the substantial rights
of the defendant are not prejudiced. In State ex Re! D T, 1134 P.3d 1148 (Utah Ct. App. 2006),
the State charged the juvenile with Sexual Abuse of a Child, of vshich he was adjudicated.
During cross-examination of the victim, she testified that the year of the offense could have been
2003 or 2004. Id at 1150. On appeal, the defendant argued that the victim's "testimony was
insufficient because she could not remember the precise year the incidents had occurred[.]" Id
at 1151. The Utah Court of Appeals stated that: "The only element of the offense at issue was
where [the victim] had been touched; the State did not need to prove the precise year in which
the abuse occurred." Id.
In State v Mar cum, 750 P.2d 599 (Utah 1988), the defendant was convicted of Sexual
Abuse of a Child. During the trial, the victim could not recall any abuse happening on the date
charged in the Information. The defendant argued that "the child's testimony failed to support
the charge against him since she could not recall any abuse occurring on the date alleged in the
information[ ]"' Id at 601. The Supreme Court stated: "Time was not an element of the offense
that the State was required to prove."' Id.

Similarly in this case, all of the offenses with which the defendant is charged do not
require u time" as an element the State is required to prove. The alleged offenses occurred while
M.B. was younger than fourteen years of age (around nine and ten years of age) and the issue of
whether or not she was a "child" is not at issue. Therefore, this Court should permit the State to
amend the information because the State is not required to prove the precise time the offense was
committed and therefore, the substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.
III.

This Court Should Permit the State to Amend the Information Because the
Evidence Suggested that the Alleged-Abuse Could Have Gone Into 2001,
Therefore, the Substantial Rights of the Defendant Are Not Prejudiced.

This Court should permit the State to amend the Information because the evidence did
suggest that the abuse could have happened in 2001 and therefore the substantial rights of the
defendant have not been prejudiced. In her original interview, M.B. told Ms. Wilson that the
defendant sexuallv abused her when she was nine and ten vears old. At the Preliminary Hearing
M.B. testified that incidents of the sexual abuse occurred when the defendant was living at their
house. She testified that the defendant came and lived at their house when she was nine, and that
he began to sexually abuse her. Preliminary Hearing Transcript p. 9 - 10, 23 - 24. M.B. testified
that the sexual abuse occurred a lot from when she was nine until he went to jail. PH p. 15. She
testified that she thought she just turned ten or was about to turn ten when the defendant stopped
living at their house and went to jail. Id. To defense counsel's question of how long the abuse
continued, M.B. stated, "Fm not - Fm not really sure. Like, I think I was about ten or ten when
he went to jail. Fm not really sure whether he went after or before, when he went to jail.
Because when he went to jail it stopped." PH p. 24 11. 9 - 1 0 . Records reveal that the defendant
was arrested on September 23, 2001, for Aggravated Robbery.
Because M.B. has repeatedly stated that she remembered the abuse stopping when the
defendant went to jail, the evidence also supports the proposed amendment to the information:
that the alleged-abuse continued into 2001 because that is when the defendant went to jail.

Because the defendant had knowledge of this information, he suffers no substantial prejudice to
his rights and the Court should permit the State's amendment.
DATED this 25th day of February, 2008.
LOHRA L. MILLER
District Attorney

.*yUjt{'
RDBERT G. NEILL
Deputy District Attorney
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

:

CASE NO. 061907251

:

JASON TYLER HAMBLIN,

:

Defendant.

Judge Randall N. Skanchy

:

The Court has before it defendant Jason Hamblin's ("Mr. Hamblin")
Motion for New Trial. The matter has been fully briefed, and the parties
argued the matter before the Court on November 14, 2008.

The matter is

now ready for decision.
BACKGROUND
On February 29, 2008,

after a three day jury trial, the

jury

returned guilty verdicts against Mr. Hamblin in the above-entitled matter
on the following counts: Rape of a Child, a First Degree Felony; Sodomy
of a Child, a First Degree Felony; and two counts of Sex Abuse of a
Child, Second Degree Felonies.

The jury acquitted Mr. Hamblin on two

counts of Object Rape of a Child, First Degree Felonies, and two counts
of Sodomy of a Child, First Degree Felonies.

The charges arose as a

result of alleged sexual abuse of the female victim who was nine and/or
ten years old at the time.

STATE V. HAMBLIN
On April

MEMORANDUM DECISION
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25, 2006,

the victim

told

police

during

an

initial

interview that two separate people, Adam Boyd (uMr. Boyd") and defendant,
Jason Hamblin, had sexually abused her.

During this interview, she

stated that Mr. Hamblin had abused her by inserting into her body an M&M
candy tube, a dildo, and a lightbulb.

At a subsequent

preliminary

hearing in May 2007, the victim reiterated that Mr. Hamblin had sexually
abused her by inserting the M&M tube and the dildo into her body, but she
made

no mention

of the lightbulb.

From her

statements, the

State

proceeded on two counts of Object Rape against Mr. Hamblin, one for the
M&M tube and one for the dildo.

In February, 2008, the State amended its

Information against Mr. Hamblin, but proceeded on the same two counts of
Object Rape,
At trial, the prosecution questioned the victim about the lightbulb.
The victim responded,
true."

u

Do you not remember me telling you...that's not

(Trial Transcript, Second Day Trial, page 108, lines 18-20.)

Hamblin's

counsel

also questioned

the victim

Mr.

as to the

discrepancy

between her initial interview and the preliminary hearing.

The victim

responded that she later had realized that it was Mr. Boyd who raped her
with the lightbulb, not Mr. Hamblin.

At the close of trial, the State

amended some of the counts against Mr. Hamblin, but once again kept the
two counts of Object Rape for the M&M tube and the dildo.
acquitted Mr. Hamblin of both counts of Object Rape.

The

jury
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Mr. Hamblin now requests a new trial citing two reasons. He argues
that

the State violated his due process right to a fair trial by

withholding evidence that could be used for impeachment purposes and that
he was denied a unanimous decision by an impartial jury.

Rule 24(a),

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, allows the Court to grant a new trial
in the interest of justice if there is error or impropriety which had a
substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party.
LEGAL DISCUSSION
1.

The State did not Suppress Evidence that Denied Mr. Hamblin a Fair

Trial
The State is required to disclose to the defense all known evidence
that may tend to negate the guilt of the accused. Utah Rule of Criminal
Procedure 16(a)(4); See also, State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah
1985) (citing State v. Jarrell , 608 P.2d 218, 224 (Utah 1980)).

Mr.

Hamblin argues that the State violated Rule 16 by failing to disclose
that the victim retracted her accusation that it was Mr. Hamblin who
perpetrated the lightbulb incident.
In Brady v. Maryland, the U.S. Supreme Court held that suppression
of evidence favorable to the accused violates due process where the
evidence is material to guilt or punishment.

373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).

The duty to disclose applies to substantively exculpatory evidence, and
may be used for impeachment. United States v. Baalev, 473 U.S. 667, 676
(1985).

In deciding whether due process has been violated, courts look

at

whether

the

information m
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defense

was

provided

the

potentially

exculpatory

a timely manner, and if not, whether the information v^as

material and the absence of which prejudiced the defense.
(i.) The Defense had the Opportunity to Address the Discrepancy at Trial
At the heart of the duty to disclose is the quest for a fair tria]
based on the totality of facts, not simply an adversarial contest between
two sides.

Carter, 707 P.2d at 662.

That being said,

[C]ourts universally refuse to overturn convictions where the
evidence at issue is known to the defense prior to or during
trial, where the defendant reasonably should have known of the
evidence, or where the defense had the opportunity to use the
evidence to its advantage during trial but failed to do so.
State v

Bisner, 2001 UT 99, % 33, 37 P.3d 1073

(2001).

In Bisner, the defense learned of exculpatory information three days
before trial, and the Utah Supreme Court found no Brady violation because
the defense had had the opportunity to address the information at trial.
The Court sustained the conviction.
v

Adams, 834 F.2d 632, 634-35

2001 UT at ^20. In

United States

(7tn Cir. 1987), the prosecuuion gave

potentially exculpatory evidence to the defense during trial but before
the testimony of the witness presenting impeachable evidence.

Again the

reviewing court sustained the conviction because the defense had

the

opportunity during trial to recall the witness or request a continuance
or recess.
Mr. Hamblm cites the Knight case as an example where potentially
exculpatory evidence was presented for the first time at trial, and tne
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Utah Supreme Court found the defendant's due process had been violated.
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987) . Kniaht is easily distinguished
from Mr. Hamblin's situation.

In Knight, upon hearing of the evidence,

the defense immediately motioned the court for a mistrial, a continuance,
and a withdrawal of counsel.

The trial court refused each motion, and

the Supreme Court ultimately reversed the conviction.

In Mr. Hamblin's

case, it is likely that his counsel had already known of the victim's
retraction before trial, but made no effort to bring the Court's
attention to the supposedly new information.

No Motion for a mistrial

or continuance was made by Mr. Hamblin.
It is unclear as to when Mr. Hamblin's counsel knew of or should
have known of the victim's lightbulb retraction, but it certainly was
prior to the end of trial.

On one hand, the victim's statement at the

preliminary hearing clearly omitted mention of the lightbulb in relation
to Mr. Hamblin. Mr. Hamblin's counsel specifically asked the victim about
the M&M container and dildo, and clarified with the victim that those
were the only two objects used by Mr. Hamblin.
for excerpts

(See State's Opp. at 4-5

from Preliminary Hearing Transcript.)

Moreover, Mr.

Hamblin's counsel indicates that he had carefully planned his case for
trial by focusing on the "discrepancy between the complaining witness'
initial disclosures and her testimony at the preliminary hearing." Thus,
Mr. Hamblin's counsel knew that the victim had retracted her accusation
as to the lightbulb and intended to use that as part of his final
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Def. Mot. at 6. Notwithstanding this assertion, Mr. Hamblin

appears to claim he was blind-sided with the lightbulb retraction at
trial:
At the trial, after defense counsel had mapped out his trial
strategy during the opening statement and referred to the
lightbulb, only then does defense counsel learn that there has
been yet another turnabout with respect to which person
perpetrated acts of sexual abuse.
Id. at 4.

The defense argues that it went into trial under the

impression that the victim had not retracted her lightbulb statement.
Id. at 7 and 8.
Regardless of whether the victim's lightbulb retraction came to the
attention of Mr. Hamblin before or during trial, Mr. Hamblin's due
process was not violated.

At trial, the State mentioned the lightbulb

to the victim, who adamantly reminded counsel of her previous retraction.
Mr. Hamblin's cross-examination of the victim also brought up the
lightbulb inconsistency.

It would seem that Mr.

Hamblin was put out

that the State approached the lightbulb issue first, and the victim had
an opportunity to give explanation to the discrepancy prior to his
questioning

rather

Nevertheless, Mr.

than

being

blind-sided

by

the

testimony.

Hamblin was aware of the evidence at the time he

cross-examined the victim on the stand and had an opportunity to impeach
her inconsistent statements.

He also had the opportunity at trial to

bring his grievance to the attention of the Court, and did not do so.

/i f» rj
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Mr. Hamblin claims that the withholding of the lightbulb retraction
had a substantial adverse effect on his right to a fair trial, given that
the State's initial mention of the lightbulb foreclosed the defense from
impeaching the victim.
stolen is not a per

That the defense's trial strategy had its thunder

se violation of due process.

(ii) The Evidence was Immaterial and did not Adversely Affect the Outcome
Because Mr. Hamblin knew of the potentially exculpatory evidence in
time to impeach the victim at trial, the Court does not need to address
the next step of analysis: whether the evidence was material to the guilt
or punishment of Mr. Hamblin.

Bradv, 373 U.S. at 87.

Yet even if the

lightbulb retraction had not surfaced until after trial, the potential
impact to Mr. Hamblin's case would have been negligible, if any.
The

Supreme Court

has

refined

the

Bradv standard for whether

evidence is material as meaning there is reasonable likelihood that the
result would have affected the outcome of the trial, or in other words,
that the suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.
Baalev, 473 U.S. at 678; see also, State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, H 32,
979 P.2d 799, 812 (1999); State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, f 26, 114 P.3d 551
(2005) (citing Kvles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)).
Here, even if the lightbulb retraction had not been disclosed until
after trial and Mr. Hamblin had been precluded from using it to impeach
the victim, the information is largely immaterial. The State charged Mr.
Hamblin

with

only

two

charges

of

Object

Rape,

not

including

the

lightbulb
Rape.
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The jury acquitted Mr. Hamblm on the two counts of Object

Even if Mr. H a m b l m had labored throughout the trial under the

illusion

that

the victim had

continued

to mistakenly

attribute

the

lightbulb incident to Mr. Hamblm, the jury was never asked to consider
this issue m

its deliberations. Mr. Hamblm simply cannot show that the

victim's retraction was likely to have any significant outcome on the
jury's ultimate decision, and therefore it did not undermine confidence
m

the trial.
The Court finds a resemblance of Mr. Hamblm's situation to that

State v

Pmder .

Mr

Pmder

claimed that his murder conviction

m
was

undermined by the State's failure to disclose a cohort's criminal record,
police corruption, and a witness' plea deal.
disagreed

and held

that not

only

could

The Utah Supreme Court

Pmder

have

discovered

the

evidence through a reasonable investigation, but even if he had

the

information at trial, "we would still be hard pressed to find that the
evidence was material, as that term is used m

the Brady context."

2 005

UT ^1H 33, 37. There, the jury was presented with information effectual Ly
leading to the same conclusion it would have come to if presented with
the material the defense claimed was suppressed.

JTd. at H 33.

In our

case, Mr. Hamblm intended to impeach the victim to demonstrate doubt as
to her

"accuracy and reliability."

Hamblm's

(Def. Mot. at 7.)

Despite Mr.

claim to the contrary, both he and the State through

oral

examination presented to the jury evidence of the victim's retractior.

STATE V. HAMBLIN
The

overriding
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concern of this Court

is that Mr. Hamblin

was

afforded a fair trial and that justice prevailed in the finding of guilt.
See, United States v. Acrurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976); State v. Bishop,
753 P.2d 439, 473 (Utah 1988). While the State is required to disclose
to the defense potentially exculpatory evidence before the end of trial,
and while the defense must have an opportunity to address the evidence
to the trier of fact, the defense also has a duty to discover
evidence through reasonable investigation.

the

Pinder, 2005 UT ^| 32. But

even suppressed and undiscovered evidence will not erode confidence in
a conviction if its disclosure and use would have been unlikely to alter
the outcome to the extent that the accused was not afforded a fair trial.
Mr. Hamblin cannot show that, first, he was without knowledge of the
lightbulb retraction before or during trial, and second, that he was
likely to receive any other outcome at trial.
2.

The Jury Decision was Unanimous and Impartial
By 10:15 p.m. on the third and last day of trial, the jury had been

deliberating for approximately five hours.

The Court asked the jurors

if they thought they might reach a decision within an hour; if unlikely,
the Court would adjourn for the day and recall the jury for Monday
morning.

The foreperson indicated that an hour would suffice, and the

jury did render its unanimous decision within the hour.
Mr. Hamblin argues that the Court's question to the jury pressured
the jurors to come to a unanimous decision, perhaps compromising the

STATE V. HAMBLIN
deliberative process.
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His argument that "it is very likely'' that the

verdict was compromised is unfounded speculation.
The Court's question to the jury in no way can be seen as a coercive
instruction.

In State v. Clements, the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the

trial court's instruction to the jury as follows:
I would sincerely hope that you can reach a verdict this
^evening. This is not a complicated case. There's only one real
issue here on the one count, and it's either "yes" or "no."
You have to make up your minds, folks.
967 P.2d 957,959 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). The appeals court held that while
a court may urge a verdict to a deadlocked jury as long as it is not
coercive, when the jury is not deadlocked the court is free to instruct
that the jurors must come to some consensus from among the options of
returning at a later time to deliberate, letting the court know if they
are deadlocked, or reaching a verdict.

Jd.

In the instant case, the

jury was not deadlocked, nor was the Court's instruction at all coercive.
The Court simply asked for an estimate of time needed and suggested that
they return Monday morning if they felt they required much more time.
Mr. Hamblin has asked for a new trial under Rule 24(a), Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure, claiming that errors of prosecutorial misconduct
and flawed jury instruction had a substantial adverse effect upon his
rights.

For the above-mentioned reasons, the Court finds that Mr.
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Hamblm was afforded a fair trial m
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line with his due process rights,

Accordingly, Mr. Hamblm7 s Motion for New Trial is denied.
Dated this

' .- day of December, 2008.

^/yVj^ ^H

^u

RANDALL N. SKANCffi? -ku \ ^ 7 > . / V ^ #
DISTRICT COURT J U D G E V '''-""Vro" 0 ^'^

STATE V. HAMBLIN

PAGE 12

MEMORANDUM DECISION

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this.
December, 2008:

Rob Neill
Deputy District Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
111 E. Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Blake Nakamura
B. Kent Morgan
Attorneys for Defendant
142 East 200 South, Suite 312
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

the

_day of

